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Software vendors often profess their dedication to security. History, how-
ever, suggests otherwise: the software market has failed to produce secure
software.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Software vulnerabilities cost businesses and consumers tens of bil-
lions of dollars each year.2  Every day brings news of freshly discovered
security flaws in major software products.3  While Microsoft, due to its
prominence in the operating system market,4 gets the brunt of the
1. Abner Germanow et al., The Injustice of Insecure Software, @STAKE, Feb. 2002, at 1,
available at http://www.netsourceasia.net/resources/atstake_injustice.pdf.
2. See Quentin Hardy, Saving Software From Itself, FORBES, Mar. 14, 2005, at 60 (quoting
an estimate that 60 billion dollars are spent annually identifying and correcting software
errors).
3. See Bruce Schneier, Foreword to JOHN VIEGA & GARY MCGRAW, BUILDING SECURE
SOFTWARE xix, xix (2002) [hereinafter Schneier, Foreword] (“The average large software
application ships with hundreds, if not thousands, of security-related vulnerabilities.”).
4. In February 2006, Windows XP held an 80.17% share of the operating system mar-
ket, and all versions of Windows held a 95.28% share.  Net Applications, Market Share
(Feb. 2006), http://marketshare.hitslink.com/report.aspx?qprid=2 (follow “February
2006” current calendar month hyperlink).  Some critics argue that the ubiquitous use of
Windows itself leads to insecure systems due to the fact that Windows provides a common
platform through which computer viruses and other harmful software can easily be spread.
See, e.g., DANIEL GEER ET AL., COMPUTER & COMMC’NS INDUS. ASS’N, CYBERINSECURITY: THE
COST OF MONOPOLY 5 (2003), http://www.ccianet.org/papers/cyberinsecurity.pdf (“Most
of the world’s computers run Microsoft’s operating systems, thus most of the world’s com-
puters are vulnerable to the same viruses and worms at the same time.”).  They argue that
insecurity could be reduced by requiring heterogeneity in operating systems. See id. (em-
phasizing the necessity of diverse operating systems to protect critical infrastructure).
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criticism for these flaws,5 there are many other companies whose
software is also targeted for security-related complaints.6
Yet, software vendors have traditionally refused to take responsi-
bility for the security of their software, and have used various risk allo-
cation provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) to shift
the risk of insecure software to the licensee.7  There were a few early
cases in which licensees sought to have courts hold vendors liable for
distributing defective software.  These cases were unsuccessful.8
Since September 11, 2001,9 increased attention has been given to
the security of critical infrastructures,10 including transportation, fi-
nance,11 the power grid,12 water supply and waste management sys-
5. See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Hackers Stepping Up Pace of Microsoft Exploits; Software Maker
Responds With an Unusually High Number of Security Fixes, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2006, at D01
(highlighting that Microsoft released dozens of security updates to Office within a single
year); Robert McMillan, Microsoft Bets Big on Vista Security, COMPUTERWORLD, July 24, 2006,
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=printArticleBasic&articleId
=9001959 (noting that Microsoft XP had countless security problems, and that the newer
Microsoft Vista may be even less secure); Jaikumar Vijayan, Microsoft Releases Seven Security
Patches, COMPUTERWORLD, July 11, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.
do?command=printArticleBasic&articleId=9001707 (detailing several security flaws in
Microsoft products).
6. The CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie-Mellon University issues periodic
Cyber Security Bulletins listing software vulnerabilities. See U.S. Computer Emergency
Readiness Team, Cyber Security Bulletins, http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/bulletins (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2008) (listing vulnerability summaries since 2004).  Each weekly bulletin con-
tains hundreds of listings regarding a variety of vendors and products.
7. See infra Part I.D.  While this Article focuses on the liability of software vendors to
their licensees, an equally important issue is the liability of software vendors to third parties
injured by insecure software, such as consumers whose personal information is obtained by
hackers exploiting weaknesses in a vendor’s software.
8. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740–41 &
n.1 (D.N.J. 1979), aff’d in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980) (finding no basis for imposing tort liability for breach of the commercial contract
and rejecting plaintiff’s claim for a new tort called “computer malpractice”).
9. While the events of September 11th brought into sharp relief the government’s
failure to secure the airline transportation system, concerns about network security were
expressed far earlier.  For example, in 1994, a report from the Joint Security Commission
to the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense stated:
“[T]he security of information systems and networks [is] the major security challenge of
this decade and possibly the next century.” JEFFREY H. SMITH ET AL., JOINT SEC. COMM’N,
REDEFINING SECURITY 2 (1994), available at http://www.loyola.edu/dept/politics/intel/jsc-
report.pdf.
10. See Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International
Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885, 886 (1999) (not-
ing that the global community’s growing dependence on computers and networks has cre-
ated a significant vulnerability because “computer networks underlie key societal functions
as diverse as finance, military command and control, medical treatment, and
transportation.”).
11. Id. at 894–95, 895 n.29.
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tems,13 computer networks,14 military,15 and homeland security and
disaster recovery,16 to name but a few.17  These sectors “are increas-
ingly dependent on the evolving information infrastructure,”18 which
in turn is increasingly dependent on secure software.19  The growing
risks inherent in insecure information technology systems have
12. See, e.g., Dan Verton, Software Failure Cited in Blackout Investigation; Task force points to
malfunction at FirstEnergy site, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 24, 2003, at 6, http://www.computer
world.com/securitytopics/security/recovery/story/0,10801,87491,00.html (reporting that
a utility company’s software failure “may have contributed significantly” to the August 2003
blackout that affected the Northeast United States); see also U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMM’N, NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2003–14: POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY OF PLANT COM-
PUTER NETWORK TO WORM INFECTION 1 (2003), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/2003/in200314.pdf (warning nuclear power
reactor licensees about potential vulnerability to plant network servers).
13. See Tony Smith, Hacker Jailed for Revenge Sewage Attacks, THE REGISTER, Oct. 31, 2001,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2001/10/31/hacker_jailed_for_revenge_sewage (detailing
how a disgruntled employee hacked into the computer network of an Australian waste
management system, causing raw sewage to flood local parks, rivers, and hotels).
14. See Bruce Schneier, Blaster and the Great Blackout, SALON.COM, Dec. 16, 2003, http://
dir.salon.com/story/tech/feature/2003/12/16/blaster_security/index.html (reporting
recent instances of business and government computer networks being attacked by worms
and viruses).
15. See NANCY R. MEAD, INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY ISSUES FOR SOFTWARE QUALITY 29 (Car-
negie-Mellon Univ., Special Report CMU/SEI-2003-SR-001, 2003), http://www.sei.cmu.
edu/pub/documents/03.reports/pdf/03sr001.pdf (warning that government and military
computer networks are susceptible to attacks, particularly as the government increasingly
relies on commercial platforms and software to contain costs).
16. See Sean M. Condron, Getting It Right: Protecting American Critical Infrastructure in
Cyberspace, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 403, 408 (2007) (suggesting that the United States con-
sider cyber attacks on critical information infrastructure as a national security matter
rather than a criminal matter to protect the nation from threats of mass destruction and
terrorism).
17. ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CREATING A NATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR
CYBERSECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF ISSUES AND OPTIONS CRS–1 (2005) [hereinafter CRS] (ana-
lyzing the effectiveness of increased government attention to flaws in computer systems
and associated infrastructure).
18. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND
THE LAW: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 1 (Stewart D. Personick & Cynthia A. Patterson eds.,
2003) [hereinafter CRITICAL INFORMATION].
19. See generally THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, at
xi (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY]
(identifying software vulnerability reduction and remediation as one of eight major initia-
tives for creating a more secure cyberspace).  As noted by FBI Director Robert Mueller,
“[t]oday a command sent over a network to a power station’s control computer could be
just as deadly as a backpack full of explosives.” FBI Director Says Businesses Reluctant to Report
Cyber Attacks, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Aug. 9, 2005.
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prompted corporate executives,20 computer security experts,21 com-
mentators,22 lawyers,23 and government officials24 to call for action.
The collapse of Enron, Tyco, and a number of other major cor-
porations, and the fraud uncovered in the aftermath, led Congress to
take a first step.  In 2002, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Public
Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act,25 which,
inter alia, requires corporate executives to certify that their computer
systems are secure.26  This has placed corporate executives in the un-
tenable position of having to certify that their computer systems are
secure (with the prospect of massive fines and a long prison sentence
if they are wrong),27 while the vendors of the software used on those
systems have no obligation, legal or otherwise, to certify that their
products are secure.
20. See Douglas A. Barnes, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEX. L. REV. 279, 327–28 (2004)
(calling for “lemon laws” for software); Gene J. Koprowski, The Web: Dealing with Cyber-
Crime, UPI, Feb. 16, 2005 (noting that some technology executives are pressuring the
White House to create a commission on cyber crime); Meridith Levinson, Let’s Stop Wasting
$78 Billion a Year, CIO MAGAZINE, Oct. 15, 2001, available at http://www.cio.com/article/
30599/SOFTWARE_DEVELOPMENT_Let_s_Stop_Wasting_Billion_a_Year (noting that
some CIOs are opting to use renewable licensing agreements or open-source technologies
to avoid pitfalls associated with bad software).
21. Gary Anthes, The Dark Side—Looming Threats for the Future of IT, COMPUTERWORLD,
Mar. 7, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=printArticle
Basic&articleId=100176 (blaming big software vendors for the “sometimes deplorable qual-
ity of commercial software”); CRS, supra note 17, at 14 (“[T]he vulnerabilities of computer R
operating systems . . . are among the most widely reported and exploited.”).
22. See, e.g., Bill Thompson, Taking on Software Liability, BBC NEWS, Oct. 7, 2005, http:/
/newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4318
502.stm (calling for software firms to improve their code and accept liability for the failure
of their products).
23. E.g., Condron, supra note 16. R
24. E.g., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN 13
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf (setting forth the
federal government’s plan to fund and protect critical infrastructure by enhancing cyber
security and reducing cyber risk); Robert Lemos, Security Czar Points Finger of Blame, CNET
NEWS.COM, July 31, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1001-947409.html?tag=fd_top (re-
porting that a presidential advisor recently criticized the software industry’s apathy toward
cyber security); Anne Saita, Government Flexes Its Spending Muscle with “Model Contract,”
SEARCHSECURITY.COM, Sept. 24, 2003, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalCon-
tent/0,289142,sid14_gci929141,00.html (explaining the new government-mandated
“model contract” that requires vendors to meet specific security requirements).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (Supp. IV 2001–2005) [hereinafter Sarbanes-Oxley Act or
SOX].
26. While the intent of the SOX provisions was to place an obligation on publicly
traded corporations to secure their systems against internal financial manipulation and
fraud, the requirements of the Act also have the unintended, but salutary, side effect of
requiring companies to secure their systems against other types of criminal activities, in-
cluding cyberterrorism.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (Supp. IV 2006).
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Why aren’t software vendors being held liable for distributing in-
secure code?  Why haven’t current laws regarding negligence, product
liability, and/or professional malpractice been applied to the develop-
ers of insecure software?  Is this situation likely to change?  These
questions and others are explored in this Article.
A. What is Software?
For the purpose of this Article, software is defined as “[a] set of
computer programs, procedures, and possibly associated documenta-
tion concerned with the operation of a data processing system, e.g.,
compilers, library routines, manuals, circuit diagrams.”28
Software can be subdivided into operating system software and
applications software.29  Both of these categories have a wide range of
definitions.30  However, for the purpose of this Article, the term operat-
ing system software (or operating system) is defined as “a software pro-
gram that controls the allocation and use of computer resources (such
as central processing unit time, main memory space, disk space, and
input/output channels).”31  The operating system “essentially serves
as the liaison between the applications software and the hardware.”32
Application software relies on the operating system to perform
many of its functions and is often viewed metaphorically as sitting “on
top of” the operating system.33  Applications are essentially “programs
that permit a user to perform some particular task such as word
processing, database management, or spreadsheet calculations, or
28. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES II, 300–34
(1984).  This is somewhat of a middle-of-the-road definition, more inclusive than those
definitions limited only to the program code and less expansive than those definitions that
include virtually everything but the hardware. See, e.g., Mgmt. Sys. Assocs., Inc. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 762 F.2d 1161, 1163 n.2 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Software is . . . define[d] as
everything that is not hardware.”); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F.
Supp. 37, 43 (D. Mass. 1990) (“[S]oftware includes one or more computer programs . . .
along with . . . instruction manuals and ‘templates’ . . . .”).
29. MICHAEL D. SCOTT, INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY LAW DESK REFERENCE 39–40,
643–46 (7th ed. 2005).
30. Id.
31. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 65 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Inno-
vation Data Processing, Inc. v. IBM, Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1470, 1472 (D.N.J. 1984) (“An
‘operating system’ is a set of computer programs which guide and control the basic func-
tion of a computer.”).
32. In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
33. ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1310, 1318 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(“Additional programs are . . . written to be used ‘on top of’ the operating system.”).
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that permit a user to play video games.”34  An application program “is
generally any computer program which is not a systems program.”35
Software security can be built into the operating system36 or pro-
vided by separate application programs,37 or both.38  This Article fo-
cuses on operating system software and security-related application
software.
To preserve the integrity of the software, and to make it difficult
for competitors39 and hackers40 to discern how the program works,
most software is distributed in object code41 form.  This is because
“[t]he binary code or machine code (or object code) is virtually
unintelligible to programmers.”42  In many cases, however, hackers
have been able to penetrate computer systems by taking advantage of
defects in the operating system or security software, and engaging in
malicious activities even without deciphering the object code or acces-
sing the source code.43
34. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 43 (D. Mass. 1990).
35. Computer Scis. Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 63 T.C. 327, 329 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., Windows XP Service Pack 2 Overview (Aug. 4, 2004),
http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/sp2/overview.mspx (providing security updates
for the Windows XP operating system).
37. See, e.g., Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 49 (1st Cir.
1998) (“[S]ecurity software is a component that can be used with the operating system to
restrict outside access to sensitive information and to restrict a particular user to informa-
tion consistent with that user’s security classification.”).
38. System security can also be built into the hardware; however, because this Article
focuses on software security issues, hardware security issues are not discussed.
39. Software can qualify as a trade secret. See, e.g., Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d
568, 575 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that a trade secret can exist in source or object codes to
computer programs).
40. For the purposes of this Article, a hacker is “an individual who accesses another’s
computer system without authority,” Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Serv., 816 F.
Supp. 432, 435 n.2 (W.D. Tex. 1993), and uses that unauthorized access to injure others.
See United States v. Scott, 316 F.3d 733, 736 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that hackers who use
information gained via unauthorized access to the detriment of others may be punished).
41. Object code is “the version of a program in which the source code language is
converted or translated into the machine language of the computer with which it is to be
used.” NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL RE-
PORT 21 n.109 (1978), available at http://digital-law-online.info/CONTU/PDF/Chapter4.
pdf.
42. United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301, 1303 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991) (explaining that
object code “is not discernible to even an expert programmer”).
43. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. R
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B. What is Insecure Software?
The term insecure software has not been defined in any reported
case or legislative enactment.44  Even in the software and system secur-
ity literature, the term is often used but never defined precisely.45  A
workable definition needs to take into account the problems that
make software insecure.  These include:
1. The existence in shipped software of vulnerabilities,
namely, “flaw[s] in an information technology product that
could allow violations of security policy”;46 and
2. The use of patches to fix known vulnerabilities.47  A
patch is a software module that is inserted into an existing
program to fix an error or vulnerability.  A patch may fix one
security problem, but introduce another problem—some-
times security related, sometimes not.48  The term patch re-
flects the fact that these software updates are no more than
bandages, fixing only a narrowly prescribed problem with
the software, and not always satisfactorily at that.49
Why are operating system and security applications software inse-
cure?  There are many reasons, including:
1. Competitive pressure to release new and updated
products;50
44. A search of Westlaw indicates that the term has been used in only a single decision,
but was not defined by the court. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Phoenix Avatar, LLC, No. 04
C 2897, 2004 WL 1746698, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (unreported decision) (noting that inse-
cure software may allow spammers to access others’ computers).
45. See, e.g., Schneier, Foreword, supra note 3, at xix–xx (referring to “bad software,” but R
failing to define the term).
46. William A. Arbaugh et al., Windows of Vulnerability: A Case Study Analysis, COMPUTER,
Dec. 2000, at 52.  “Antecdotal evidence alone suggests that known and patchable vulnera-
bilities cause the majority of system intrusions.” Id.
47. See Ashish Arora et al., Sell First, Fix Later: Impact of Patching on Software Quality, 52
MGMT SCI. 465, 466 (2006) (explaining why a software vendor has an incentive to release a
product with problems into the market and fix the problems afterwards).
48. “When companies try to fix programs, some 15% of newly introduced bugs aren’t
detected before release . . . .  And when bugs are fixed, 7% of the repairs are faulty, with
nearly half the new bugs capable of crippling an application or causing major errors.”
Steven V. Brull, Then There’s the Cost of Fixing the Fixes . . . , BUS. WEEK, Dec. 14, 1998, at 40,
available at http://www.businessweek.com/datedtoc/1998/981214.htm.
49. “Effectiveness of patches is somewhere between band-aids and a stiff drink.”
GERMANOW ET AL., supra note 1, at 4; see also Reid Skibell, The Phenomenon of Insecure Software R
in a Security-Focused World, 8 U. FLA. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 107, 115 (2003) (stating that using
patches means continually applying makeshift code, which often creates as many problems
as it fixes).
50. See Bruce Schneier, Liability and Security, CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSLETTER, Apr. 15, 2002,
available at http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0204.html#6 [hereinafter Schneier, Lia-
bility] (“[T]he marketplace rewards low quality. More precisely, it rewards early releases at
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2. Costs of development and testing,51 and the impact
of those costs on profits;52
3. Difficulties of testing for security vulnerabilities;53
4. Poor project management practices;54
5. Software and system complexity;55
6. Inability of customers to determine the existence of
security vulnerabilities;56 and
7. Lack of significant business57 or legal58 risks to the
vendor in distributing insecure software.
the expense of almost all quality.”); see also Skibell, supra note 49, at 113 (explaining that R
the effort expended on security flaws is often “proportional to the immediacy of the
deadline”).
51. See Schneier, Liability, supra note 50 (“The costs of adding good security [to R
software] are significant—large expenses, reduced functionality, delayed product releases,
annoyed users . . . .”); see also GLENFORD J. MYERS, THE ART OF SOFTWARE TESTING 9 (Tom
Badgett et al. eds., 2004) (noting that the fact that it is impractical or even impossible to
find all of a program’s errors impacts the economics of testing); Erin Kenneally, Stepping on
the Digital Scale: Duty and Liability for Negligent Internet Security, 26 LOGIN: MAG. OF USENIX &
SAGE 62, 66 (2001), available at http://www.usenix.org/publications/login/2001-12/pdfs/
kenneally.pdf (arguing that developers “invariably focus on business and technology con-
cerns (functionality and time-to-market) at the expense of security . . . .”).
52. Many commentators, however, argue that making software more secure is not that
expensive. See Scott Berinato, The Big Fix, CSO MAG., Oct. 2002, available at http://www.cso
online.com/read/100702/fix.html (arguing that “90 percent of hackers tend to target
known flaws in software” and “you can teach any freshman compsci student” to fix those
flaws).
53. See, e.g., Skibell, supra note 49, at 129 (“A conceptual reason why security testing is R
so difficult is namely that what one is trying to establish is the nonexistence of
something.”).
54. See JODY ARMOUR & WATTS S. HUMPHREY, SOFTWARE PRODUCT LIABILITY 13 (1993),
available at http://www.sei.cmu.edu/pub/documents/93.reports/pdf/tr13.93.pdf (noting
that over 80 percent of software organizations studied by Carnegie Mellon’s Software Engi-
neering Institute had very poor project management practices).
55. Arbaugh et al., supra note 46, at 52 (“Complex information and communication R
systems give rise to design, implementation, and management errors.”); Bruce Schneier,
Software Complexity and Security, CRYPTO-GRAM NEWSLETTER, Mar. 15, 2000, available at http:/
/www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0003.html (explaining that digital systems have gotten in-
creasingly complex, resulting in less security).
56. See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Law and Economics of Software Security,
30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 314–15 (2006) (describing the theory that suppliers have
little incentive to “add high levels of security because the buyer has no low-cost method for
ascertaining quality”); Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of Information Security,
314 SCIENCE 610, 610 (2006), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/314/
5799/610.pdf (same).
57. See Schneier, Liability, supra note 50 (“[T]he costs of ignoring security are minor: R
occasional bad press, and maybe some users switching to competitors’ products. Any smart
software vendor will talk big about security, but do as little as possible.”); see also Skibell,
supra note 49, at 129 (stating that the high cost of switching providers encourages compa- R
nies to continue working with a provider even after learning of substantial security failings
in their software).
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These reasons create major impediments to efforts to compel
software vendors to provide secure software.
C. Is Software a Good or a Service?
Whether software is a good or a service is a critical question when
examining whether software should be the subject of product liability
or professional malpractice claims.59  That issue was hotly debated in
the 1980s in the context of Article 2 of the U.C.C.60
Article 2 applies by its own terms only to transactions in goods.61
The term goods means “all things [including specially manufactured
goods] that are movable at the time of identification to a contract for
sale.”62  To determine whether the U.C.C. applies to a particular com-
puter transaction, it is necessary first to ascertain whether goods are
involved.
Computer hardware, as a movable object, is clearly a good and
thus subject to the provisions of Article 2.63  Although hardware trans-
actions often involve incidental services, such as installation, training,
and maintenance, the presence of such services does not impair appli-
cation of the U.C.C.64  Transactions involving primarily personal ser-
vices, however, such as those for maintenance, training, and support,
are often held not to be goods, and thus not to fall within the U.C.C.65
58. See Kenneally, supra note 51, at 65 (explaining that software companies currently R
have no legal duty to take reasonable care to secure their products).
59. It is less of an issue in negligence law, because a claim can be based on negligent
conduct as well as the negligent design or manufacturing of a product.
60. See generally Amelia H. Boss & William J. Woodward, Scope of the Uniform Commercial
Code; Survey of Computer Contracting Cases, 43 BUS. LAW. 1513, 1514–15 (1988) (chronicling
the discussions surrounding the application of the U.C.C. to intangibles such as computer
programs).
61. U.C.C. § 2-102 (2007).
62. Id. § 2-103(k).
63. David A. Owen, The Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer
Contracts, 14 N. KY. L. REV. 277, 278 (1987).
64. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 742 (D.N.J.
1979) (finding that a software transaction was for the sale of goods, despite the inclusion of
incidental services in the lease agreement); Dynamics Corp. v. Int’l Harvester Co., 429 F.
Supp. 341, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (explaining that application of the U.C.C. depends on the
“essence or main objective of the parties’ agreement”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Dreier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 527 A.2d 875, 879 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (explain-
ing that the sale of a computer is governed by the U.C.C., despite the fact that services are
rendered as well).
65. See Heidtman Steel Prods., Inc. v. Compuware Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870 n.1,
871 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (U.C.C. does not apply to a series of contracts for the selection,
modification, and installation of software); Conopco, Inc. v. McCreadie, 826 F. Supp. 855,
871 (D.N.J. 1993) (U.C.C. does not apply to consulting agreement for purchase of com-
puter system); Computer Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655
(D.S.C. 1970), aff’d, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971) (U.C.C. does not apply to data processing
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Some courts, however, have been willing to apply the U.C.C. when a
service contract also includes the sale of goods.66  As the amount of
goods involved in a service contract increases, the likelihood that the
U.C.C. will be applied increases as well.
Major software transactions may involve the provision of both tan-
gible property (e.g., the media on which the software is stored, docu-
mentation) and services (e.g., customization, installation, training,
maintenance, support).  The services inherent in off-the-shelf software
that is bundled67 with hardware are generally considered incidental to
the goods aspect of the transaction, and the entire contract is deemed
controlled by the U.C.C.68
The same is generally true for bundled, custom software: “Al-
though the ideas or concepts involved in the custom designed
software remained [the seller’s] intellectual property, [the buyer] was
purchasing the product of those concepts.  That product required ef-
forts to produce, but it was a product nevertheless and, though intan-
gible, is more readily characterized as ‘goods’ than ‘services.’”69
As a result, most contracts involving bundled software, either off-
the-shelf or custom, fall within Article 2.70  There is still a split of opin-
services); Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecomms. & Info. Sys., Inc., 788 S.W.2d
386, 388–89 (Tex. App. 1990) (U.C.C. does not apply to contract for installation and leas-
ing of telephone system).
66. See, e.g., Fed. Express Corp. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 623 F.2d 1297, 1300
(8th Cir. 1980) (applying the U.C.C. to portion of jet sales contract for training of crews);
USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little, Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (applying
the U.C.C. to analyze a contract that involved software and services where the services were
incidental).
67. “Bundling in the computer industry is a practice by which a computer manufac-
turer charges a single price for the hardware and software, and other services provided,
along with the sale of the computer system.” SCOTT, supra note 29, at 87–88. R
68. See, e.g., Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 334 (E.D. Pa.
1973), aff’d, 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding that the goods and services were virtu-
ally inseparable and allowing recovery of the entire bundled price under the U.C.C.); Niel-
son Bus. Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Monteleone, 524 A.2d 1172, 1174–75 (Del. 1987) (determining
that the consulting services that accompanied the purchase of a computer system were
ancillary to the contract and could not be separated to avoid the implied warranties of the
U.C.C.); Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215, 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974) (applying the U.C.C. to a contract dispute against a provider for failing to
properly program computer equipment); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d
76, 81 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding that specific and comprehensive installation condi-
tions may constitute evidence of an express warranty subject to the U.C.C.).
69. Triangle Underwriters, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 765, 769 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), modified on other grounds, 604 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1979).
70. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text; see also Commc’ns. Groups, Inc. v. R
Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 344 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (explaining that com-
puter software is generally considered to be a tangible item and qualifies as a “good” under
the U.C.C.).
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ion on whether unbundled (standalone) software qualifies as a good
because of its dominant service aspect,71 although the majority of
cases have held that the transaction is one for goods, governed by the
U.C.C.72
D. The Application of Article 2 to Computer Software
The application of Article 2 to software transactions73 offers ven-
dors the opportunity to use the provisions of the U.C.C. to limit the
71. A few courts have held that custom programming is predominantly a service
outside the U.C.C. See, e.g., Wharton Mgmt. Group v. Sigma Consultants, Inc., 50 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 678, 681 (Del. 1990) (finding that the contract for the design of computer
software was primarily for services, not goods, and thus, outside the scope of the U.C.C.);
Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986) (determining that the U.C.C. did not apply to a contract to “design, develop and
implement an electronic data processing system”); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434
N.W.2d 97, 98, 100 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a custom software design contract
indicated the purchase of services, not goods, and thus the U.C.C. did not apply).
However, a growing number of courts have held that a software development contract
is or may be a contract for goods governed by the U.C.C. See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys. v.
Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 651, 654–55 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that a contract for
custom-made software and corresponding technological support fell into the U.C.C.); Ad-
vent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675–76 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding software devel-
oped under a contract to be a good within the meaning of the U.C.C.); RRX Indus. v. Lab-
Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding that the U.C.C. controlled a transac-
tion in which the sale of computer software dominated the service aspects of the contract);
Colonial Life Ins. Co. v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 817 F. Supp. 235, 238–39 (D.N.H. 1993)
(finding that the U.C.C. applied to sale of computer software where the contract also pro-
vided for years of servicing of the program); see also Downriver Internists v. Harris Corp.,
929 F.2d 1147, 1151 (6th Cir. 1991) (declining to decide the question of whether software
development contracts are goods for purposes of the U.C.C., “except to observe that genu-
ine issues of material fact on the goods vs. services issue existed”); Harford Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Seibels, Bruce & Co., 579 F. Supp. 135, 138 (D. Md. 1984) (denying a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that it is a question of fact as to whether software developed
under contract is a good or service under the U.C.C.).
An ancillary question is whether a software license is equivalent to a sale.  A majority of
reported decisions have held that the fact that software is licensed does not preclude appli-
cation of Article 2. See Stephen L. Sand, Validity, Construction, and Application of Computer
Software Licensing Agreements, 38 A.L.R. 5th 1, 20–23 (1996) (listing cases in which courts
held explicitly or implicitly that the U.C.C. applied to agreements involving computer
software licenses).
72. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  For additional cases where courts found R
that software programs are goods, see Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91,
94 n.6 (3d Cir. 1991); Synergistic Techs., Inc. v. IDB Mobile Commc’ns., Inc., 871 F. Supp.
24, 29 n.7 (D.D.C. 1994); First Nationwide Bank v. Florida Software Servs., Inc., 770 F.
Supp. 1537, 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Hou-Tex, Inc. v. Landmark Graphics, 26 S.W.2d 103,
108 n.4 (Tex. App. 2000); M.A. Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305,
310 (Wash. 2000).
73. Whether Article 2 applies to software transactions has been an issue widely dis-
cussed in the literature. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 63.  For a decade, efforts were made to R
develop a new uniform contract law to apply to software and database transactions.  Origi-
nally called U.C.C. Article 2B and then renamed the Uniform Computer Information
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risks they assume in marketing their software products.  These provi-
sions include warranty disclaimers74 and limitation of liability and
remedies.75
1. Warranty Disclaimers
Despite the elaborate warranty provisions in the U.C.C.,76 both
express warranties and implied warranties can be disclaimed or modi-
fied by contract.77  While warranty disclaimers are generally presumed
valid,78 such disclaimers “are construed strictly in favor of the
buyer.”79
No reported decision has unequivocally held that a software ven-
dor has breached an express warranty.80  There are three possible rea-
sons for this:
First, software manufacturers scrupulously avoid making ex-
press claims that software will perform any particular tasks,
although they freely claim that their products have nearly
mystical qualities.  Secondly, any express promises are inevi-
tably disclaimed in licensing agreements.  Thirdly, it is gener-
ally agreed that software cannot be expected to perform
Transactions Act (UCITA), the drafting process became mired in controversy. See MICHAEL
J. WALDMAN, NTS AM. JUR. 2D Computers and the Internet § 50 (2005) (generally discussing
the UCITA); James S. Heller, UCITA: Still Crazy After All These Years, and Still Not Ready for
Prime Time, 8 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5 (2001) (chronicling the controversy surrounding the
UCITA).  After being adopted in only two states, Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-501.1 et.
seq. (2006), and Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 22-101 (West 2002), the UCITA
lost the support of its sponsoring organizations. See Patrick Thibodeau, Sponsors Pull Sup-
port for Controversial UCITA Law, COMPUTERWORLD, Aug. 1, 2003, http://www.computer
world.com/governmenttopics/government/legalissues/story/0,10801,83676,00.html.
74. See infra notes 76–87 and accompanying text. R
75. See infra notes 88–102 and accompanying text. R
76. See U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a) (2007) (implied warranty of title); id. § 2-313(1)(a) (ex-
press warranties); id. § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability); id. § 2-315 (implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose).
77. Id. § 2-316; see also, e.g., Peerless Wall & Window Coverings, Inc. v. Synchronics,
Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 519, 528–29 (W.D. Pa. 2000), aff’d, 234 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 2000)
(concluding that limitations on a license’s warranty properly disclaimed the U.C.C.’s im-
plied warranties of merchantability and fitness).
78. See, e.g., Siemens Credit Corp. v. Marvik Colour, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 686, 694
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (presuming that a waiver of warranties and consequential damages was
valid).
79. LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 138 (West 2002
rev.) (1985); see also Sierra Diesel Injection Serv., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 874 F.2d 653,
658 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that exclusions of warranties are generally construed against
the drafter); Commc’ns. Groups, Inc. v. Warner Commc’ns., Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1988) (invalidating the exclusion of a warranty because it was not conspicu-
ous and the buyer was not notified that there was no implied warranty).
80. David Polin, Proof of Manufacturer’s Liability for Defective Software, 68 AM. JUR. PROOF
OF FACTS 3d. 333, 347 (2002).
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perfectly, so such warranties as exist will be interpreted some-
what loosely.81
Courts generally uphold implied warranty disclaimers unless they
are found to be unconscionable.82  While courts are reluctant to apply
the doctrine of unconscionability in the commercial context,83 a war-
ranty disclaimer has been found to be unconscionable where:
1. The contract is one of adhesion;
2. There is an inequality of bargaining power;
3. A complex piece of equipment is involved, about
which the buyer has little knowledge to independently deter-
mine whether the equipment would fulfill the buyer’s needs;
and
4. The seller has expressly represented that the equip-
ment is adequate.84
There is a split of authority as to whether or not warranty dis-
claimers must be made by each entity in the distribution chain in or-
81. Id.
82. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2004) provides that:
If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to en-
force the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
See also Hartland Computer Leasing Corp. v. Ins. Man, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1989) (“Only such provisions of the standardized form which . . . are unexpected and
unconscionably unfair are held to be unenforceable.”).
In addition, courts generally will not allow the vendor to disclaim express warranties,
particularly when they are included in the contract itself, finding that “a warranty dis-
claimer inconsistent with an express warranty is inoperative.”  L.S. Heath & Son, Inc. v.
AT&T Info. Sys., 9 F.3d 561, 570 (7th Cir. 1993); accord Sierra Diesel, 890 F.2d 108, 113
(9th Cir. 1989) (finding that “warranty disclaimer clauses in printed form contracts were
ineffective to avoid the express warranty”).
83. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-9, at 172 (2d ed. 1980) (“In general, without a showing of procedu-
ral impropriety, courts will not invalidate in the name of unconscionability in commercial
settings.”); see Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. S. Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696, 699 (8th Cir. 1974)
(finding disclaimer limiting remedies not unconscionable given expertise of parties and
absence of evidence showing a disparity in bargaining power); Badger Bearing Co. v. Bur-
roughs Corp., 444 F. Supp. 919, 923 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (rejecting a claim of
unconscionability).
84. See A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 126 (1982) (applying the
doctrine of unconscionability to a complex transaction where the seller used a preprinted
form agreement and had disparate bargaining power, and the sale resulted in allocating
commercial risks in an socially or economically unreasonable manner). See generally John
E. Murray, Jr., Unconscionability; Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1969) (proposing a
theoretical structure for unconscionability).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 15 11-MAR-08 9:31
2008] TORT LIABILITY FOR VENDORS OF INSECURE SOFTWARE 439
der to be effective.85  Most courts require privity of contract for a
disclaimer of implied warranties to apply.86  Some courts, however,
made no such requirement.87
2. Limitation of Liability and Remedies
The remedies available to a plaintiff for breach of warranty and
the liability of the breaching party may be limited by contract.88  One
method of limitation is through the use of a liquidated damages provi-
sion.89  Another method is to include within the contract a clause that:
(1) provides a specific, exclusive,90 limited remedy, such as repair or
replacement of defective parts;91 (2) limits the total liability of the ven-
dor to a specific dollar amount, such as the total price paid on the
85. See, e.g., Transp. Corp. of Am. v. IBM Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 958–59 (8th Cir. 1994)
(finding that disclaimers extend to third party purchasers or end users); Prof’l Lens Plan,
Inc. v. Polaris Leasing Corp., 675 P.2d 887, 898–99 (Kan. 1984), aff’d, 710 P.2d 1297, 1304
(Kan. 1985) (declining to extend the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness to
non-privity manufacturers or sellers); Spagnol Enters., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 568
A.2d 948, 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (explaining that privity is not required in suits between
manufacturers and consumers for breach of warranty in Pennsylvania).
86. See supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Barazzotto v. Intelligent Sys., Inc., R
532 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (quoting 3 LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316:155, at 232 (2002)) (“[T]he manufacturer’s dis-
claimer of warranties does not run with the goods so as to protect any subsequent seller of
them.  To the contrary, each subsequent seller must make his own independent disclaimer
in order to be protected from warranty liability.”); id. at 151 (explaining that a retailer can
be expected to know whether software will be fit for a particular use, at least to the extent
of its compatibility with specific hardware, whereas a manufacturer cannot because it can-
not know how the buyer plans to use the software).
87. See, e.g., Spring Motors Distribs. v. Ford Motor Co., 489 A.2d 660, 663 (N.J. 1985)
(holding that privity of contract with the remote supplier is not required for implied war-
ranties); Spagnol Enters., 568 A.2d at 952 (finding that privity is not required for suits be-
tween manufacturers and consumers).
88. U.C.C. §§ 2-316(4), 2-718, 2-719 (2004); see also, e.g., AES Tech. Sys., Inc. v. Coher-
ent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933, 939 (7th Cir. 1978) (“By limiting the warranties available and
the remedies under the warranties, parties are able to provide a consensual allocation of
risk in accordance with sound business practices.”); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp.,
958 F. Supp. 1536, 1542 (N.D. Okla. 1997) (explaining that Oklahoma law allows parties to
limit remedies for breach of contract unless the terms are unconscionable).
89. U.C.C. § 2-316(4).
90. Unless a limitation provision is “expressly agreed to be exclusive,” it is “optional.”
Id. § 2-719(1)(b); see also, e.g., David Cooper, Inc. v. Contemporary Computer Sys., Inc.,
846 S.W.2d 777, 779 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that absent a specific provision that a 90-
day provision is the only remedy, a buyer has a reasonable time to determine whether or
not goods are defective).
91. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(a); see Hunter v. Tex. Instruments, Inc., 798 F.2d 299, 302 (8th
Cir. 1986) (upholding seller’s ability to limit liability for breach of express warranties to
repair or replace); Consol. Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385,
392 n.6 (9th Cir. 1983) (“A remedy limited to repair is not unconscionable per se.”);
Ritchie Enters. v. Honeywell Bull, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1041, 1048 (D. Kan. 1990) (“The
remedy of repair and replacement offers the seller an opportunity to cure defects and to
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contract or the total amount paid during a specified time period;92 or
(3) limits the buyer to only direct damages93 by excluding all special,94
incidental,95 or consequential96 damages.97
At least in commercial transactions, liability limitation clauses
“generally are valid and enforced by the courts.”98  However, such
clauses must be carefully drawn because any ambiguity will be con-
strued against the drafting party.99  Furthermore, in addition to argu-
minimize its liability exposure and provides the buyer with goods which conform to the
contract within a reasonable period of time.”) (citation omitted).
92. See Brown v. SAP Am., Inc., No. C.A. 98-507-SLR, 1999 WL 803888, at *8–10 (D.
Del. Sept. 13, 1999) (upholding a contract provision limiting seller’s liability for losses to a
refund of the license fees paid); Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Oracle Corp., 3 Computer
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 46,519, at 63,437, 63,442 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (noting that consequential dam-
ages may be limited to a certain amount unless the limitation of exclusion is unconsciona-
ble); Garden State Food Distribs., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 512 F. Supp. 975, 978 (D.N.J.
1981) (holding damages for breach of warranty were limited to express contract terms
which limited recovery to the price paid for the equipment).
93. Am. Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F. Supp. 1473,
1488–89 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding that buyer’s recovery was limited to direct damages); see
Electro-Matic Prods., Inc. v. Creata Data, Inc., 1 Computer Cas. (CCH) ¶ 46,052, at 61,008,
61,009 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (same).
94. “[S]pecial damages are those that ensue, not necessarily or ordinarily, but because
of special circumstances.”  Applied Data Processing, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 394 F. Supp.
504, 509 (D. Conn. 1975) (quoting Ruggles v. Buffalo Foundry & Mach. Co., 27 F.2d 234,
235 (6th Cir. 1928)).
95. U.C.C. § 2-715(1) (2004) (incidental damages “include expenses reasonably in-
curred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully re-
jected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with
effecting cover and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach”).
96. See id. § 2-715(2) (consequential damages include “any loss resulting from general
or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting had
reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented . . . and injury . . . proxi-
mately resulting from any breach of warranty”).  Many courts have upheld the validity of
contracts that exclude recovery of consequential damages for commercial loss.  Transp.
Corp. of Am. v. IBM Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 960 (8th Cir. 1994) (“An exclusion of consequent-
ial damages set forth in advance in a commercial agreement between experienced business
parties represents a bargained-for allocation of risk that is conscionable as a matter of
law.”); D.S. Am. (E.), Inc. v. Chromagrafx Imaging Sys., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 786, 794
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (noting that a contract may exclude consequential damages unless it is
unconscionable); Wausau Paper Mills Co. v. Chas. T. Main, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 968, 975
(W.D. Wis. 1992) (same).  But see St. John’s Bank & Trust Co. v. Intag, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 627,
629 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (awarding consequential damages).
97. See Krider Pharmacy & Gifts, Inc. v. Medi-Care Data Sys., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 221,
224–26 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (finding that buyer’s recovery was limited to direct damages be-
cause contract excluded liability for special, incidental, or consequential damages); Hi
Neighbor Enters., Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 492 F. Supp. 823, 826 (N.D. Fla. 1980) (same).
98. See Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Prophet 21, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829
(E.D. Pa. 2000) (noting that liability limitations in commercial contracts are valid under
Pennsylvania law).
99. See Consol. Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 708 F.2d 385, 392 (9th
Cir. 1983) (determining that a clause that limited remedies to repair of defective equip-
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ing ambiguity, an injured party can also claim that the limitation
clause should not be enforced because it is unconscionable,100 failed
its essential purpose,101 or was induced by fraud.102
While contract law sometimes provides a software licensee with a
remedy against a software vendor, the vast majority of reported deci-
sions have held instead that the risk allocation provisions of Article 2
will be applied, thereby limiting or barring recovery to the injured
software licensee.103
II. APPLYING NEGLIGENCE LAW TO INSECURE SOFTWARE
“[M]any experts have suggested the use of tort law as a model for
computer-related cases.”104  Indeed, some argue that those who de-
velop software and computer systems are in the best position to take
action to prevent security breaches,105 and that the imposition of lia-
ment did not apply when the warranted goods failed to perform to specifications despite
seller’s efforts to repair); Lovely v. Burroughs Corp., 527 P.2d 557, 563 (Mont. 1974) (find-
ing that a clause limiting consequential damages arising from delay in delivery did not bar
recovery for losses due to product malfunction).
100. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. But see Consol. Data Terminals, 708 R
F.2d at 392 n.6 (“A remedy limited to repair is not unconscionable per se.”).
101. See Chatlos Sys. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1086 (3d Cir. 1980)
(determining that a contractual limitation to limit remedies to repairs was unenforceable
because the remedy failed its essential purpose); Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney &
Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364, 381–82 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (“Where such circumstances
cause a limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose . . . the limitation of buyer’s remedy
to repair or replacement is inoperative . . . .”); cf. W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580
S.W.2d 76, 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (declining to permit summary judgment in favor of
buyer where buyer did not plead that his remedy was unconscionable or had failed in its
essential purpose).
102. U.C.C. § 2-721 (2004) (“Remedies for material misrepresentation or fraud include
all remedies available under this Article for non-fraudulent breach.”); Am. Elec. Power Co.
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“[T]he contractual
limitation of liability precluding the recovery of consequential damages cannot be effective
if plaintiffs’ claims of fraudulent inducement are sustained at trial.”).
103. For instance, in Mesa Business Equipment, Inc. v. Ultimate Southern California, Inc., No.
89-55825, 1991 WL 66272 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 1991) (unpublished table decision), Mesa, an
office supply company, claimed that defects in software provided by a computer vendor,
Ultimate Corporation, caused it to go bankrupt. Id. at *1.  Mesa sued in bankruptcy court
for over $2 million in damages. Id.  The Ninth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court
judge that the warranty disclaimers in the contract precluded Mesa from recovering any
money from the defendants. Id. at *4.
104. CRITICAL INFORMATION, supra note 18, at 3. R
105. See id. at 3–4  (“The applicability of tort law and the potential for civil lawsuits and
monetary damages could encourage companies to invest in computer security measures.”);
see also Kenneally, supra note 51, at 64–65 (positing that software manufacturers should be R
assigned a legal duty of reasonable care to maintain software security).
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bility on developers will motivate them to create more secure
software.106
There have been a number of class action suits filed against
software vendors and software users for breaches of security, particu-
larly where such breaches have exposed consumers’ personal and fi-
nancial data to criminals who, in turn, have used the data for identity
theft and other financial crimes.107  “Such plaintiffs may allege that
vendors were negligent in their production or design of computer se-
curity systems, including . . . their coding of security and encryption
software.”108  However, while negligence law is an attractive tool to use
against software vendors who distribute insecure software,109 it has
some critical limitations.
First, to state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must plead and
prove that: (1) the software vendor owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2)
the vendor breached its duty; (3) the breach of duty was a cause-in-
fact of the plaintiff’s injury; (4) the breach was a proximate cause of
the plaintiff’s injury; and (5) the plaintiff suffered compensable dam-
ages as a result of that breach.110  Each of these elements creates chal-
lenges for a plaintiff seeking to hold a vendor liable for insecure
software.
A. Duty
The first question is: what duty, if any, does a software vendor owe
to a licensee to provide secure software?  A duty of due care must exist
106. See Schneier, Liability, supra note 50 (“The engine of this [software security] im- R
provement will be liability—holding software manufacturers accountable for the security
and, more generally, the quality of their products—and the timetable for improvement
depends wholly on how quickly security liability permeates cyberspace.”); id. (“If we expect
software vendors to reduce features, lengthen development cycles, and invest in secure
software development processes, they must be liable for security vulnerabilities in their
products.”); cf. Jeffrey D. Neuburger & Maureen E. Garde, Information Security Vulnerabili-
ties: Should We Litigate or Mitigate?, SOFTWARE L. BULL., Apr. 2004, at 3 (questioning the
relationship between liability litigation and product improvement).
107. See generally Kevin P. Cronin & Ronald N. Weikers, Liability for Data Security and
Privacy Breaches, 23 ANDREWS COMPUTER & INTERNET LITIG. REP. 11 (2005).
108. Id.
109. Negligence claims, for example, may be available in situations in which product
liability claims may not be available. See, e.g., Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429, 1439–40
(3d Cir. 1992) (holding that a design was not defective under product liability law, but a
finding of negligence was possible); Tillman v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 871 So. 2d 28,
34–35 (Ala. 2003) (finding that a cigarette smoker might recover in negligence, but could
not recover under strict liability).
110. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 2.1, at 61 (2005).
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between the defendant and an injured party before liability can be
imposed.111
With respect to insecure software, there are two possible duties of
a vendor: (i) a duty to design and develop secure software; and (ii) a
duty to instruct the licensee on “how to use its products safely and to
warn them of hidden dangers that the products may contain.”112
The existence of a duty “is largely a policy-based determina-
tion.”113  Determining the existence of a duty of a software vendor will
require a court to balance a number of factors, including:
the foreseeability of the harm of computer intrusions or
other breaches of security, the degree of certainty between
software vulnerabilities and harm, the closeness of the con-
nection between lax Internet security practices and the in-
jury suffered by a computer user; the policy of preventing
future intrusions; the burden on the information industry
and the consequences to the community of imposing a duty
to maintain adequate security; and the availability, costs and
prevalence of security solutions as well as insurance.114
It is generally foreseeable that any complex software will have
“bugs.”115  The problem is that it is not foreseeable exactly what those
bugs will be, or what the impact of those bugs will be on the licensee
or a third party.116  If these security problems were known to the ven-
111. Atlas v. Selwyn, 4 Computer Cas. (CCH) ¶ 46,834, at 65,112 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).  Ac-
cording to the Second Restatement of Torts, duty:
denote[s] the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself in a particular
manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes subject to liability to
another to whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other, of which
that actor’s conduct is a legal cause.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT].
The term duty “is particularly valuable in describing the requirement that action shall
be taken for the protection of the interests of others.  It is also useful to describe the
requirement that the actor, if he acts at all, must exercise reasonable care to make his acts
safe for others.” Id. § 4 cmt. B.
112. OWEN, supra note 110, § 2.1, at 62–63. R
113. JOHN L. DIAMOND ET AL., UNDERSTANDING TORTS § 8.01, at 118 (2d ed. 2000); see
also, e.g., NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 19, at 37 (“All users of cyberspace have some R
responsibility, not just for their own security, but also for the overall security and health of
cyberspace.”).
114. Michael L. Rustad, The Negligent Enablement of Trade Secret Misappropriation, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 455, 519–20 (2006), based upon factors set forth in Row-
land v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
115. See FREDERICK P. BROOKS, JR., THE MYTHICAL MAN-MONTH: ESSAYS ON SOFTWARE EN-
GINEERING 182–84 (1995) (discussing how the complexity of computer software leads to
technical problems).
116. See Public Wiki, Criteria for a Lab to Certify Software, http://abstract.cs.washing-
ton.edu/wiki/index.php/Criteria_for_a_Lab_to_Certify_Software (last visited Feb. 20,
2008) (stating that bugs are often minor mistakes that “live in a huge sea of code, millions
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dor, arguably, a reasonable vendor would attempt to fix them.117  To-
day, while major vendors have undertaken programs to make their
software more secure,118 it is still often users and other organizations
who first identify security flaws in software.119  Even when a flaw is
identified, it is not necessarily true that the vendor will fix it immedi-
ately (or at all).120
Because vendors (meaning developers and suppliers of the
software) generally distribute only the machine-readable object code
of their products,121 they are the only ones who know the actual level
of security of their software and, therefore, are the only ones who can
isolate and repair the problems.  Hence, it is argued, software vendors
owe a duty to their licensees and to society as a whole to ensure the
security of their software.122
B. Standard of Care
Even assuming that a duty is found, the next question is: What is
the standard of care imposed on the software vendor by that duty?
The amount of care and the type of conduct required will vary with
the circumstances, but a general, objective standard of care, that is,
what the reasonably prudent person would do under the circum-
stances, does not change.123  As noted in a recent article:
of lines long for much commercial software, that is set up in untold numbers of different
environments, with different configurations, different inputs and different interactions
with other software”); but see Skibell, supra note 49, at 112 (“[S]ome of the most problem- R
atic security concerns are eminently foreseeable and may not have even been that difficult
to fix.”).
117. But see Kenneally, supra note 51, at 66 (explaining that software developers “invaria- R
bly focus on business and technical concerns (functionality and time-to-market) at the ex-
pense of security.  It is no secret that programmers have had the knowledge and ability to
prevent many buffer overflow vulnerabilities choose not to because of business reasons.”).
118. E.g., Robert Lemos, One Year On, Is Microsoft Trustworthy?, CNETNEWS.COM, Jan. 23,
2003, http://news.com/2100-1001-981015.html.
119. See Ted Bridis, Microsoft Admits Easy Hack for Passport Service, PITTSBURGH TRIB. REV.,
May 9, 2003 (reporting that a security specialist found a major security flaw in Microsoft
Passport in about four minutes); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text. R
120. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. R
121. See supra notes 41–42  and accompanying text. R
122. It is generally conceded that the complexity of major software packages, and the
variety of applications in which the software is used, makes it impossible for vendors to
offer bug-free software. See BROOKS, supra note 115, at 183–84 (noting that complexity R
creates technical and management problems that make it difficult to find and destroy all
bugs).  However, that does not mean that they should not have a duty to use all means
reasonably available to them to provide secure software.  As noted by one commentator,
“[t]he costs associated with insecure computers on the Internet weigh heavily in favor of
assigning a duty to secure systems.”  Kenneally, supra note 51, at 64. R
123. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 283 (establishing the “reasonable man” R
standard); id. § 296(1) (explaining that emergency situations factor into determining
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The standard of care with respect to claims related to secur-
ity practices is evolving rapidly; methodologies, procedures,
and practices have been accepted by the industry, and are
continually being improved.  The standard of care for secur-
ity is a moving standard relative to the risks exposed.124
In Invacare Corp. v. Sperry Corp.,125 a district court refused to dis-
miss a negligence claim alleging that a computer seller was negligent
for recommending its program and services to the buyer when “it
knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care, it should have known,
that . . . the programs and related data processing products were inad-
equate,”126 and because it advertised to the buyer when it knew or
should have known that “the programs furnished could not satisfy
[the buyer’s] requirements.”127  Applying section 299A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, the court held that personnel in the computer
industry, like personnel in other trades, should be held to the ordi-
nary standard of care for their trade.128
In the software context, “the appropriate level of care to be fol-
lowed in developing a custom computer program . . . will vary depend-
ing on the nature and intensity of the perceived risk resulting from an
error.”129  The software vendor’s duty under negligence law is not
perfection, but only reasonableness.130  Thus, the software does not
need to be error-free.  It need only meet the standard of care of a
whether one acted as a “reasonable man under the circumstances”).  Other Restatement
provisions address the level of care owed by a member of a trade: “one who undertakes to
render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and
knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or trade in good standing in
similar communities.” Id. § 299A; see also cmt. b. (explaining that section 299A is a special
application of the reasonable man standard and noting that if an individual has “greater
skill than that common to the profession or trade, he is required to exercise that
skill . . . .”).
124. Cronin & Weikers, supra note 107, at 11. R
125. 612 F. Supp. 448 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
126. Id. at 453.
127. Id.
128. Id. (“If machinists, electricians, carpenters, blacksmiths, and plumbers, are held to
the ordinary standard of care in their professions, the Court fails to see why personnel in the
computer industry should be held to any lower standard of care. . . .  Negligence in the business
setting is clearly actionable.”) (emphasis added).
129. 2 RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 10:30, at 10–81 (3d
ed. 2006).
130. Software vendors argue, often successfully, that all software is subject to defects
(“bugs”), and that software cannot be made perfect.  While this may be true, it is not unrea-
sonable to hold a vendor to a higher standard of care for software used in critical applica-
tions (e.g., network security) than software for video games or word processing.
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reasonable vendor of security-related software under the
circumstances.131
One key element in establishing a standard of care for secure
software is to determine whether there is a custom or usage in the
software industry regarding the security standards applicable to oper-
ating system and other security-related software.  In assessing the
proper standard of care, industry-wide practices should be reviewed.
The term “best practices”132 refers to those technical, business, and
management practices that have proven successful and are used by a
large number of companies in an industry.  At a minimum,133 imple-
menting best practices in secure software development and testing134
should be required to avoid a negligence claim.
However, a court may hold a defendant to a higher standard than
that set by the industry if it finds that the industry standard is inade-
quate.135  For example, in The T.J. Hooper v. N. Barge Corp.,136 the
owner of an oceangoing tugboat was found liable for the loss of barges
131. Kenneally, supra note 51, at 66 (“The standard of care/scope of the duty will de- R
pend on the quality and quantity of the measures needed to secure relative to the actor’s
ability to control, assumption of responsibility, and/or socioeconomic concerns.”).
132. Paul Murphy, Software Vulnerabilities and the Future of Liability Reform, LINUXINSIDER,
Jan. 22, 2004, http://www.linuxinsider.com/story/32660.html (remarking that best prac-
tices are not clearly defined: “The question, of course, is what constitutes a best practice,
and the only answer I’ve ever found is that a best practice is whatever an expert wit-
ness . . . is likely to believe it to be.”).
133. For example, some states grant the provider, via statute, an affirmative defense if
the product was “state of the art” at a specified time, often the time of its initial sale. See,
e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (2002) (allowing the use of a “state of the art” af-
firmative defense in product liability actions for inadequate design or fabrication); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-20-5-1(1) (LexisNexis 1998 & Supp. 2006) (establishing a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a product is not defective when it conforms with the generally recognized
“state of the art”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668.12(1) (West 1998) (providing a defense against
product liability action where a product conformed to the state of the art when it was
designed or created); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,182 (1995) (establishing a defense against
product liability action when a product at the time of sale conformed with the state of the
art, defined as the “best technology reasonably available”).
134. As noted in the Comments to the UCITA:
A great deal of theoretical and practical work is currently focused on techniques
to reduce the time and cost needed to determine program “correctness.” Profes-
sional standards also exist for software quality evaluation.  Commercially reasona-
ble use of existing testing techniques can be one benchmark of whether a
computer program is merchantable in law.  As industry standards evolve, what
constitutes a merchantable program will evolve along with those standards.
LORIN BRENNAN ET AL., THE COMPLETE UCITA § 403 cmt. 3(a) (2004).
135. See SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 295A (“In determining whether con- R
duct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others under like circumstances, are
factors to be taken into account, but are not controlling where a reasonable man would
not follow them.”).
136. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
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it was towing because of its failure to equip the tugboat with a radio
that could receive weather forecasts.137  The defendant presented evi-
dence that the installation and use of a radio was not widely done in
the maritime industry, and, therefore, its lack of a radio was consistent
with the industry standard.138  Rejecting that position, Judge Hand
stated that “Courts must in the end say what is required; there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not
excuse their omission.”139
Thus, while “compliance with industry-wide standards is often an
acceptable demonstration of due care,”140 that is not always the case.
As noted in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Glenn L. Martin Co.,141 “the fact
that Northwest conformed to the practice of other airlines in failing to
equip [its planes] with radar did not establish its exercise of ordinary
care as a matter of law.  Customary practice is not ordinary care; it is
but evidence of ordinary care.”142
Industry-standard software development and testing practices
may provide a baseline for determining the requisite standard of care
for the developer of security-related software, but they do not necessa-
rily establish the actual standard of care that a vendor must meet.  The
potentially catastrophic losses that may result from use of insecure
software encourage a significantly higher standard of care for software
development in this area.  The exact standard of care must be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.
C. Breach of Duty
Once it has been shown that the defendant owed a duty of due
care to the plaintiff, it is then necessary to establish that the defendant
breached that duty by an act or omission that exposed the plaintiff to
an unreasonable risk of harm, that is, that the defendant acted negli-
gently.143  “The breach of a duty . . . does not make the actor liable.  It
137. Id. at 737, 740. But see Hendry Corp. v. Aircraft Rescue Vessels, 113 F. Supp. 198,
201 (E.D. La. 1953) (finding that the mere absence of a radio does not make a tug
unseaworthy).
138. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 739–40.
139. Id. at 740 (citations omitted).
140. CRITICAL INFORMATION, supra note 18, at 4. R
141. 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955).
142. Id. at 129.  In a later case, a court declined to follow Hooper and Northwest Airlines
because “[i]n neither case was the question of customary practice related to negligence in
design,” and “[c]arriers have traditionally been held to a higher standard of care than
others.”  Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 450 F.2d 1176, 1185 (5th Cir. 1971).
143. See, e.g., Weirum v. RKO Gen., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975) (“Liability is imposed
only if the risk of harm resulting from the act is deemed unreasonable.”); see also Deromedi
v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 636 F. Supp. 392, 395 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (finding that a
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merely subjects him to liability.”144  In the area of secure software, no
accepted tests currently exist for determining when a particular
software vendor has breached its duty, although many have been pro-
posed.  For example, some scholars argue that software vendors
should be found negligent “based upon marketing products or ser-
vices where there was a high foreseeability of harm with readily availa-
ble means ‘to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.’”145
D. Causation
Causation is established by a two-pronged test.  First, the defen-
dant’s negligence must have been the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s
injury.146  Cause-in-fact is proved by showing that “but for” the defen-
dant’s negligence, the injury would not have occurred,147 or that the
negligence was a “substantial factor” in bringing about the injury.148
In computer security breach cases, there are generally multiple
factors involved in the breach.  Not only must the software have cer-
tain security vulnerabilities, but a third party (generally a hacker or
other cybercriminal) must intentionally exploit the vulnerabilities to
gain access to the system.  The user may also be partly at fault for not
properly implementing available security measures.  If the court ap-
plies a “but for” test, the software’s security defects may be found not
to be the cause-in-fact of damages, while if the court applies a “sub-
stantial factor” test, it is likely that the software defects will be held to
be a substantial factor in the security breach.
Second, the defendant’s conduct must have been the proximate
(or legal) cause of the injury; that is, the plaintiff’s damages must have
been a foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligent act.149  For in-
stance, in Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.,150 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
breach of a statutory duty to provide a safe workplace did not supersede a worker’s negli-
gent use of equipment in determining the cause of an injury).
144. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 4 cmt. a.  In the Second Restatement of Torts, R
the term “subject to liability” is used “to denote the fact that the actor’s conduct is such as
to make him liable for another’s injury, if (a) the actor’s conduct is a legal cause thereof,
and (b) the actor has no defense applicable to the particular claim.” Id. § 5.
145. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cyber-
crime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1575 n.112 (2005).
146. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 113, § 11.02, at 202. R
147. Id.
148. Id. § 11.03, at 203.
149. See, e.g., Evans v. Thomason, 72 Cal. App. 3d 978, 983 (1977) (explaining that
“[t]he question is not whether [a] defendant did foresee, or by the exercise of ordinary
care should have foreseen . . . [but] whether it is reasonably foreseeable that injury or
damage would likely occur.”).
150. 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
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the Second Circuit held that a navigational chart maker’s use of erro-
neous information in its navigational maps was the proximate cause of
a fatal airplane crash.151  Unlike Saloomey, where damages arose from a
specific, identifiable act of negligence, when a breach of security oc-
curs, “it is often difficult to pinpoint just what has gone wrong.”152
Proving proximate cause becomes increasingly difficult as the software
in question becomes longer and more complex—exactly the charac-
teristics of most operating systems and other security-related software.
Foreseeability acts as a limitation both on a finding of causa-
tion153 and on the amount and nature of damages that can be recov-
ered for negligence.154  As technology continues to develop, courts
will likely find foreseeable activities that were less obvious (not fore-
seeable) in the past.155
E. Damages
A plaintiff is entitled to recover all damages proximately caused
by a defendant’s negligence.156  These can include personal inju-
ries,157 property damage,158 and, in some states, economic losses.159
Punitive damages are not recoverable.160
It is not necessary for a defendant to anticipate every possible sce-
nario under which someone could be injured.  For example, “[i]t
would be totally unreasonable to require that a manufacturer warn or
protect against every injury which may ensue from mishap in the use
151. Id. at 677–78.
152. John M. Conley, Tort Theories of Recovery Against Vendors of Defective Software, 13
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 16 (1987).
153. See DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 113, § 12.03, at 216. R
154. Id.
155. Lawrence B. Levy & Suzanne Y. Bell, Software Product Liability: Understanding and
Minimizing the Risks, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 9–10 (1989); see Curtis E.A. Karnow, Liability for
Distributed Artificial Intelligence, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 147, 180–81 (1996) (noting that what
is reasonably foreseeable “depends on custom and what people generally believe.  These in
turn may depend on general impressions of what technology can do . . . .  Reasonable
foreseeability is a moving target; it dodges and weaves depending on public policy, and on
the perceived technological sophistication of the population.”).
156. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. R
157. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 6, 13 (D. Ariz. 1979) (permitting
recovery for personal injuries, including past and future medical damages, loss of earning
capacity, and pain and suffering).
158. See, e.g., George A. Hormel & Co. v. Maez, 92 Cal. App. 3d 963, 966, 971 (1979)
(affirming award covering damaged equipment in suit arising out of motor vehicle
collision).
159. See infra Part II.F.2.
160. See Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Arms, 91 U.S. 489, 492–93 (1875) (recognizing that
departure from the general prohibition on punitive damages is permissible only in cases of
gross negligence).
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of his product.”161  It is also not necessary for a plaintiff to show that
the seller foresaw a specific injury or the amount of the loss.  A plain-
tiff need only show that a reasonable person in the seller’s position
would have foreseen in the ordinary course of events that damages
would follow from the seller’s breach.162
The limitation placed on damage recovery by the foreseeability
requirement can be extremely important in the computer context,
where the hardware, and often the software, is specifically designed to
be general-purpose.163
Where software is a mass-marketed operating system or security
software, it is certainly foreseeable that it will be used in unmodified
form to operate a computer system and secure that system against cer-
tain categories of harm, and that any defects in that software could
lead to unauthorized intrusions into and damage to the system or the
data stored in the system.164
F. Difficulties in Applying Negligence Law
1. Intervening and Superseding Causes
The issue of whether a computer system is insecure arises when
someone has been able to obtain unauthorized access to the system
through a vulnerability in software security.  Such conduct is almost
always criminal in nature.  Under traditional negligence law, where
damage is caused by a third party’s criminal act, the potential liability
161. Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F.2d 751, 760 (7th Cir. 1966); see also Perrine v.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 186 C.A.2d 442, 449 (1960) (“Even one who maintains so dangerous
an instrumentality as a high power line need not anticipate at his peril every possible fortu-
itous circumstance under which someone may make contact with the wires causing in-
jury . . . .”); but see Hormel, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 970 (holding the driver of a car who, while
intoxicated, knocked down a utility pole, causing a power surge, liable for resulting dam-
ages to a nearby business).
162. Barnard v. Compugraphic Corp., 667 P.2d 117, 120 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983).
163. General-purpose computer systems may create problems because:
[they] are designed to perform a variety of tasks, many of which may not have
been envisioned by their creators.  It may reasonably be argued that it is foresee-
able that accounting software could cause certain damages to a business, such as
lost revenues, lost profits, and even lost customers, if it were defective.  It stretches
credulity, however, to argue that it would be reasonably foreseeable to the devel-
oper of a word processing package that a defect in the package could cause bil-
lions of dollars in damages if used to develop an emergency procedure manual
for a nuclear power plant.
David E. Jordan, The Tortious Computer—When Does EDP Become Errant Data Processing?, 4
COMPUTER L. SERV. § 5-1, art. 2, at 10 (1977).
164. See Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort Liability, 57
S.C. L. REV. 255, 274 (2005) (discussing that the Palsgraf rule is “equally applicable to cases
involving database security”).
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of the negligent party generally is superseded by the criminal conduct
unless it is determined to be “highly foreseeable.”165
While security software vendors are certainly aware of hackers
and others who have infiltrated computer systems by exploiting vul-
nerabilities in certain software packages,166 that alone may not mean
that the injury suffered by a particular plaintiff was highly foreseeable
to the vendor.  The proliferation of websites167 and blogs168 that re-
port on security breaches in specific software packages, however,
makes it at least arguable that a vendor knows or should know, not
only of the flaws in its products, but also that injuries are likely to arise
from a third party’s exploitation of those breaches.
The duty analysis is also impacted by the fact that virtually all of
the acts that result in damages from insecure computers are con-
ducted by third parties who use the computer system to engage in
criminal conduct.  Courts have generally held that, except under ex-
traordinary circumstances, a party is entitled to assume that third par-
ties will not commit intentional criminal acts.169
165. Akins v. Dist. of Columbia, 526 A.2d 933, 935 (D.C. 1987).  As stated in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts:
Whether he is liable or not depends on matters which are usually beyond his
control.  Thus, whether or not he is liable depends upon whether his breach of
duty results in an injury to someone to whom the duty is owing in such a manner
as to make the breach of the duty a legal cause of the injury, and this depends
upon the course of events subsequent to the actor’s breach of his duty, a matter
over which the actor has no effective control . . . .
SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 4 cmt. a. R
166. Software vulnerabilities are noted almost daily in the computer industry press and
certain online sites. See, e.g., supra notes 5–6; see also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 145, at R
1570 (“In a networked world, it is reasonably foreseeable that computer hackers or cyber-
criminals will discover and exploit known vulnerabilities in operating systems.”).
167. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute, CERT Coordination
Center, http://www.cert.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (reporting on business software
security developments); SearchSecurity.com, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com (last vis-
ited Feb. 20, 2008) (reporting “security-specific” news).
168. See, e.g., London Software Testing News UK, http://testinglondon.wordpress.com
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (blogging on international software testing news).
169. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 302B cmt. d; see also Gaines-Tabb v. ICI R
Explosives USA, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 1304, 1318 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (holding that a manufac-
turer of fertilizer and blasting caps was not liable for bombing of a federal building be-
cause the manufacturer was entitled to believe that third parties would not engage in
intentional criminal conduct).  The reasons for this rule are twofold:
The first reason is a probabilistic judgment that foreseeability analysis requires.
Individuals generally are significantly deterred from undertaking intentional
criminal conduct given the sanctions that can follow.  The threatened sanctions
make the third-party intentional criminal conduct sufficiently less likely that,
under normal circumstances, we do not require the putative tort defendant to
anticipate it . . . .
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Does the distribution of insecure software involve the sort of ex-
traordinary circumstances under which the software vendor should
anticipate a third party’s criminal act?  There are two situations in
which most courts have found extraordinary circumstances.
First, some courts have found extraordinary circumstances where
the defendant has a “special relationship” with the victim and, thus,
has a duty to protect the victim against third party intentional criminal
conduct.170  A vendor of security-related software generally does not
have a special relationship with each licensee of its software.  Typi-
cally, the only relationship is contractual, which does not alone create
a special relationship for purposes of tort liability.171  The contract
defines the terms of the relationship, including the allocation of risks.
Courts are traditionally unwilling to allow a party to a contract to
avoid the limitations contained in the contract by bringing a negli-
gence action.172
The second situation is where the defendant’s affirmative actions
“create a high degree of risk of [the third party’s] intentional
misconduct.”173
Generally, such circumstances are limited to cases in which
the defendant has given a young child access to ultra-hazard-
ous materials such as blasting caps or firearms.  Even in those
cases, courts have relied on the third party’s severely dimin-
The second reason is structural.  The system of criminal liability has concen-
trated responsibility for an intentional criminal act in the primary actor, his ac-
complices, and his co-conspirators.  By imposing liability on those who did not
endeavor to accomplish the intentional criminal undertaking, tort liability would
diminish the responsibility placed on the criminal defendant.  The normative
message of tort law in these situations would be that the defendant is not entirely
responsible for his intentional criminal act.
James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 694 (6th Cir. 2002).
170. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 358 (Cal. 1976)
(noting that special relationships create an exception to the general rule that a person
does not owe a duty to control the conduct of another).
171. See, e.g., A.T. Kearney, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 73 F.3d 238, 240–42 (9th Cir. 1995) (find-
ing no special relationship between the parties of a computer design contract); see also
NMP Corp. v. Parametric Tech. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 1547 (N.D. Okla. 1997) (finding
no duty beyond the contractual agreement, and, thus, denying tort remedies); Columbus
McKinnon Corp. v. China Semiconductor Co., 867 F. Supp. 1173, 1179 (W.D.N.Y. 1994)
(same).
172. In addition to direct purchasers, third parties injured by an insecure system (e.g.,
whose personal information is stolen from an insecure system or who are otherwise injured
by a system malfunction) are even further removed from the vendor, and the two have no
special relationship. See, e.g., James, 300 F.3d at 693–94 (finding no special relationship
between a video game developer and the victims of a video game player who was allegedly
induced by the game to commit acts of violence).
173. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 302B cmt. e.H. R
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ished capacity to handle the ultra-hazardous materials.  With
older third parties, courts have found liability only where de-
fendants have vested a particular person, under circum-
stances that made his nefarious plans clear, with the tools
that he then quickly used to commit the criminal act.174
Neither of those circumstances arise in cases involving the distri-
bution and use of insecure software.  The licensee of the software is
generally a sophisticated business entity or government agency with
MIS staff who understand computers, software, and system security is-
sues.  These individuals are neither children nor those with “nefarious
plans” to use the software to commit a criminal act.
However, in some states, courts have held that a duty may be
found, even when third party criminal conduct is present, where “spe-
cial circumstances” exist.175
A purveyor of insecure software should realize that its conduct
may involve an unreasonable risk of harm to those who use or rely
upon the software, and, therefore, it has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to prevent that risk from occurring (i.e., a duty to provide secure
software).176
2. Economic Loss Rule
Courts are split over whether economic losses are recoverable for
negligence claims.177  There are two aspects to the “economic loss”
174. James, 300 F.3d at 694–95 (citations omitted).
175. See Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.H. 2003), in which the
court recognized a “special circumstances” exception for when a party has created an un-
reasonable and foreseeable risk of criminal misconduct, and thus imposed a duty to pre-
vent harm to those foreseeably endangered.
176. See Randal C. Picker, Cybersecurity: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky, in THE LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS OF CYBERSECURITY 115, 130 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2006) (“[K]ey
infrastructure providers have been held liable even in the face of malicious acts by third
parties who might naturally be understood to be the actual source of the harm.”).
177. Some courts allow recovery for economic losses, at least in some circumstances.
Interfase Mktg., Inc. v. Pioneer Techs. Group, Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1355, 1359–60 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (allowing a misrepresentation claim as an exception to the economic loss rule where
no contract remedy was available); U.S. Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 587 F. Supp. 49,
50 (D. Colo. 1984) (recognizing liability for pecuniary loss in a claim for negligent misrep-
resentation); J’aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979) (“Recovery for injury to
one’s economic interests, where it is the foreseeable result of another’s want of ordinary
care, should not be foreclosed simply because it is the only injury that occurs.”); Black,
Jackson & Simmons, Ins. Brokerage, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 440 N.E.2d 282, 284 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982) (allowing recovery of economic losses for negligent misrepresentation).
Other courts have stated that economic losses are not recoverable. See Apollo Group,
Inc. v. Avnet, Inc., 58 F.3d 477, 479–81 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the tort of negligent
misrepresentation is not an exception to the economic loss rule, barring recovery strictly
for pecuniary losses); Transp. Corp. of Am. v. IBM Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 956–57, 960 (8th
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rule.  The first is that a party to a contract for the sale of goods cannot
recover under negligence law for economic losses that are unrelated
to personal injury or property damages; recovery for such losses are to
be determined by contract law.178  This prohibition “is premised on
the idea that such damages are recoverable under Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C.) warranty provisions.”179  In other words, “there is
no duty to exercise reasonable care to protect against a loss that is
purely economic in nature.”180
A typical case in which the economic loss rule has prevented re-
covery is where a computer failure resulted in only pecuniary dam-
ages, such as lost profits and lost goodwill.181  While a licensee of
insecure software may also suffer similar losses, security breaches may
give rise to other, non-pecuniary losses—often of a much more severe
nature.
For instance, a major security breach may cause the software user
to suffer a significant loss of reputation, “an interest protected by tort
law.”182  For example, in 2005, CardSystems Solutions suffered a secur-
ity breach that exposed up to 40 million MasterCard accounts,183 as
well as credit card information from several other major credit card
companies, to identity thieves.184  The breach resulted in significant
Cir. 1994) (barring tort remedies to recover purely economic losses); Krider Pharmacy &
Gifts v. Medi-Care Data Sys., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 221, 226 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (same); Wausau
Paper Mills Co. v. Chas. T. Main, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 968, 971 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (same);
Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 325–26 (D. Md.
1983) (same); Jaskey Fin. & Leasing v. Display Data Corp., 564 F. Supp. 160, 166 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (same); Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 791–92 (E.D. Wis.
1982) (same); Affiliates for Evaluation & Therapy, Inc. v. Viasyn Corp., 500 So. 2d 688, 693
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
178. Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (E.D. Va.
2002); Office Supply Co., 538 F. Supp. at 791–92; Word Mgmt. Corp. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc.,
525 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).
179. Rogers Merch., Inc. v. Bojangles’ Corp., No. 87-C-5001, 1989 WL 6391, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 24, 1989).  However, where the contract is deemed one for services, and not the
sale of goods, U.C.C. Article 2 does not apply, and a suit for negligence would lie. Word
Mgmt. Corp., 525 N.Y.S.2d at 436.
180. Rockport Pharmacy, Inc. v. Digital Simplistics, Inc., 53 F.3d 195, 198 (8th Cir.
1995).
181. See, e.g., Krider Pharmacy, 791 F. Supp. at 226 (rejecting a commercial purchaser’s
claim for damages based on lost earnings and lost reputation because a computer system
did not cause damage to “other property”).
182. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 21 cmt. c, illus. 1 (1998)
[hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
183. Ashlee Vance, MasterCard Fingers Partner in 40m Card Security Breach, REGISTER, June
18, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/06/18/mastercard_breach.
184. It was claimed that the breach was due to vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s Windows
2000 operating system and IIS Server 5.0. See Softpedia, Microsoft Software to Blame for
the CardSystems Solutions Data Security Breach? (June 21, 2005), http://news.softpedia.
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adverse publicity for CardSystems Solutions,185 resulting in a major
loss of reputation and several large customers, including VisaUSA and
American Express.186
The second aspect of the “economic loss” rule is that where a
product causes no personal injury or property damage (other than to
the product itself), such damages are deemed economic loss for which
no negligence claim lies.187
In Transport Corp. of America v. IBM Corp.,188 for example, TCA
sued IBM, claiming that a disk drive failure caused data to be dam-
aged, resulting in lost income and data.189  TCA asserted claims in
negligence and strict liability.190  The court barred TCA’s recovery for
lost data under the economic loss rule, holding that “where a defect in
a component part damaged the product into which that component
was incorporated, economic losses to the product as a whole [are] not
losses to ‘other property.’”191  The court held that the data was in ef-
fect a component of the entire computer system and, thus, not sepa-
rate property for tort law.192
Transport Corp. is clearly distinguishable from a situation where
data is lost or destroyed due to insecure software.  First, in the case of
insecure software, the data is not lost or destroyed by the software
itself, but by a third party who uses the vulnerabilities of the software
to gain access to the computer system and uses that access to damage
or destroy the data.  The defect in the software leads only indirectly to
com/news/Microsoft-Software-to-Blame-for-the-CardSystems-Data-Security-Breach-3440.
shtml.  Those vulnerabilities allowed hackers to install rogue software to gain access to
stored data.  However, much of the blame was also laid at the feet of CardSystems itself, for
failing to implement the agreed-upon security measures.  Jonathan Krim & Michael
Barbaro, 40 Million Credit Card Numbers Hacked, WASH. POST, June 18, 2005, at A01.
185. See, e.g., Jaikumar Vijayan & Todd Weiss, CardSystems Breach Renews Focus on Data
Security, COMPUTERWORLD, June 20, 2005, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/
security/story/0,10801,1102646,00.html.
186. Bruce Schneier, Visa and AmEx Drop CardSystem (July 21, 2005), http://www.
schneier.com/blog/archives/2005/07/visa_and_amex_d.html.
187. See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870–71 (1986)
(explaining that purely economic loss is not recoverable in tort when “no person or other
property” is damaged); see also Rockport Pharmacy, Inc. v. Digital Simplistics, Inc., 53 F.3d
195, 198 (8th Cir. 1995) (explaining that loss of data caused by a software problem is not
damage to “other property”).
188. 30 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 1994).
189. Id. at 955–56.
190. Id. at 956.
191. Id. at 957 (citation omitted).
192. Id.; accord Rockport Pharmacy, 53 F.3d at 198 (“Rockport contends that it sustained a
loss of data installed in the computer system.  We conclude, however, that such losses re-
present nothing more than ‘commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of
profits.’”).
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the loss or destruction of the data due to the intervention of a third
party.
Second, unlike the complete computer system in Transport Corp.,
where the data could be viewed as a component of the system itself,
and where a vendor is providing only the software, any data entered
into the computer system by the customer would not be considered
part of the software—and hence not part of the “product.”193  The
data and the software are separate forms of digital information.  The
data can be read and manipulated by the software, but it is created by
the user or a third party, not the software vendor.  Therefore, destruc-
tion of data due to insecure software should not be deemed damage
to or destruction of the software itself, and should not bar recovery of
damages by the licensee under the second prong of the economic loss
rule.
3. Contractual Preclusion
A majority of courts hold that where a contract between a buyer
and seller exists, a negligence claim is unavailable and the aggrieved
party is limited to a breach of contract claim.194  “The mere existence
of a contract does not give rise to a duty in tort.”195  As stated by one
court:
In most circumstances, where a party to a transaction ren-
ders a service or sells a product, there would have been no
duty to render that service or sell that product except for the
voluntary undertaking to do so; that being true, the contract
governing the transaction normally defines the scope of the
parties’ obligations to one another.196
193. See, e.g., Saratoga Fishing Co. v. J.M. Martinac & Co., 520 U.S. 875, 879 (1997)
(holding that items added to a product are “other property” and not part of the initial
product).  Thus, data input to the computer system by the software user should be consid-
ered “other property” and not part of the software “product.”
194. E.g., Mesa Bus. Equip., Inc. v. Ultimate S. Cal., Inc., No. 89-55825, 1991 WL 66272,
at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 30, 1991) (citing S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int’l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363,
1376 (9th Cir. 1978)); Antel Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc. v. Sirus Leasing Co., 475 N.Y.S.2d
944, 945 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (noting that when an “injury is properly characterized” as
economic loss, a “plaintiff is relegated to contractual remedies”); Westfield Chem. Co. v.
Burroughs Corp., 21 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 1293, 1299 (Mass. Super. 1977) (“The negligent
manufacturing count fails since it is basically a duplicate of the warranty and contract
counts and hence barred by the agreement . . . .”).
195. Rockport Pharmacy, 53 F.3d at 198.
196. Heidtman Steel Prods., Inc. v. Compuware Corp., No. 3:97CV7389, 2000 WL
621144, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 15, 2000) (citing W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 657 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEE-
TON]); see also Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. China Semiconductor Co., 867 F. Supp. 1173,
1183 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (“[P]ublic policy does not warrant the imposition of a duty upon [a
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Contractual limitations on liability will be enforced when ordi-
nary negligence is involved, because “the U.C.C. should apply to com-
mercial transactions where the product merely failed to live up to
expectations and the damage did not result from a hazardous
condition.”197
Otherwise, if a court allowed the plaintiff to circumvent the nego-
tiated allocation of risk provisions in a contract merely by dressing its
claims in tort clothing, it “would interfere with the ability of the con-
tracting parties to allocate and bargain for risk of loss.  Warranty law,
not tort law, protects the business purchaser’s expectation of suitabil-
ity and quality.”198
The only exception to this rule is where the negligent conduct
has caused physical damage to persons, property, or other tangible
things (other than economic loss).199
III. APPLYING PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW TO INSECURE SOFTWARE
Under product liability law, liability is imposed on the theory that
“[t]he costs of damaging events due to defectively dangerous products
can best be borne by the enterprisers who make and sell these prod-
ucts.”200  For the plaintiff, there are many advantages to a product lia-
bility claim over a breach of contract claim.  The two most important
benefits are (i) no privity of contract is required for recovery, and (ii)
contractual disclaimers and limitations are not enforceable.201
The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A sets forth the ele-
ments of a claim for strict product liability:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
computer design consultant] to exercise reasonable care beyond his contractual duties.”);
Richard A. Rosenblatt & Co. v. Davidge Data Sys. Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2002) (finding no “cognizable legal duty distinct from that created by the parties’
contracts”).
197. Transp. Corp. of Am. v. IBM Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 958 (8th Cir. 1994).
198. Kerry A. Kearney, Computer Dissatisfaction: Should Tort Remedies Be Permitted or Does the
U.C.C. Still Govern?, 7 J.L. & COM. 243, 244–45 (1987).
199. Heidtman Steel Prods., 2000 WL 621144, at *12.
200. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 196, at 692–93; see also THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra R
note 182, § 2(b) (considering a product to have a defective design when the seller could R
have avoided foreseeable risks of harm by adopting a reasonably alternative design).
201. Neuburger & Garde, supra note 106, at 5. R
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(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such
a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or con-
sumer without substantial change in the condition in
which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the
preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product
from or entered into any contractual relation with the
seller.202
The doctrine applies to “any product sold in the condition, or
substantially the same condition, in which it is expected to reach the
ultimate user or consumer.”203  Under Section 402A, the seller would
be subject to strict liability “even though he has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of the product.”204
It is not a question of fault but simply a determination of
how society wishes to assess certain costs that arise from the
creation and distribution of products in a complex techno-
logical society in which the consumer thereof is unable to
protect himself against certain product defects.205
However, the mere fact that a security device fails to protect the
victim in a particular situation does not necessarily establish that the
product was unreasonably dangerous.206
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability reformulated
product liability law by redefining product defectiveness:
A product:
(a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product de-
parts from its intended design even though all possible care
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the
product;
202. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 111, § 402A. R
203. Id. cmt. d.
204. Id. cmt. a.
205. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991).  However, the
Ninth Circuit eventually refused to extend strict liability to the content of plaintiff’s book.
Id. at 1034–35.
206. See, e.g., Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F. Supp. 151, 160–62 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(holding the fact that a tamper-resistant seal could be defeated by a determined criminal
did not make it unreasonably dangerous); Hampshire v. Ford Motor Co., 399 N.W.2d 36,
37–38 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (dismissing a lawsuit alleging an ignition locking system was
defective because it was circumvented by a car thief); Aronson’s Men’s Stores, Inc. v. Potter
Elec. Signal Co., 632 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Mo. 1982) (en banc) (holding that a malfunction-
ing burglary alarm system was not unreasonably dangerous).
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(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of harm
posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by
the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the seller
or other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial
chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative de-
sign renders the product not reasonably safe; . . . .207
Due care (negligence analysis) is explicitly excluded from this defini-
tion—it is a strict liability analysis.208  It requires a determination of
the “intended design” and a comparison of the intended design to the
product itself.  A design defect, on the other hand, arises from the
failure to adopt a reasonable alternative design that would have made
the product reasonably safe—a traditional negligence analysis.209
Accordingly, in applying product liability law to insecure software
defects,210 it is necessary to determine first whether the software inse-
curity is due to a design defect or a manufacturing defect.
Software development generally goes through a number of
phases before reaching the user.  These steps can be classified as (i)
the design phase, (ii) the coding phase, (iii) the testing phase, and
(iv) the replication and distribution phase.211  There is no argument
that a defect introduced into the product during the design phase
would be deemed a design defect.  And likewise there is no debate
that a defect introduced into the product at the replication and distri-
bution phase would be deemed a manufacturing defect.  However,
the most critical issue left open to debate is the coding phase (and to
a lesser extent the testing phase).  Should these phases be considered
part of the design process or the manufacturing process of a software
product?
Vendors would generally argue that everything before the replica-
tion and distribution phase is part of the product design process,
hence, a negligence standard should apply to insecure software, ex-
cept in the rare case where the defect occurred in the replication
process.
207. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 2. R
208. Id. cmt. a.
209. Id.
210. No court decision has yet applied the Third Restatement to software defects. See id.
§ 19, Reporter’s Notes to cmt. d.  It has been argued that due to the Third Restatement’s
“retreat from strict liability to a negligence-based standard, it seems unlikely that the courts
adopting the Restatement will be receptive to stretching product liability concepts to
software, digital information, and other intangibles.”  Rustad & Koenig, supra note 145, at R
1577.
211. See generally MICHAEL D. SCOTT, 2 SCOTT ON INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY LAW § 10.04,
at 10-6 (3d ed. 2007) (explaining the process of developing the specifications of software
and websites).
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VENDOR’S POSITION
Applicable Test Software Development Phases
Design Defect/Negligence Design Phase
Standard Coding Phase
Testing Phase
Manufacturing Defect/Strict Replication and Distribution Phase
Liability Standard
Licensees would argue that the design defect standard should ap-
ply only to defects introduced in the design phase, and that everything
thereafter should be deemed part of the manufacturing phase—and
subject to a strict liability standard.
LICENSEE’S POSITION
Applicable Test Software Development Phases
Design Defect/Negligence Design Phase
Standard
Manufacturing Defect/Strict Coding Phase
Liability Standard Testing Phase
Replication and Distribution Phase
The licensee’s position is more in line with the commonly under-
stood stages involved in software development212—that software de-
sign is generally completed before software coding begins.213  The
training and duties of software designers and coders are usually differ-
ent, particularly among those working for the larger software vendors
that are most likely to be developing operating systems and major se-
curity-related software products.214
212. See Peter A. Alces, W(h)ither Warranty: The B(l)oom of Products Liability Theory in Cases
of Deficient Software Design, 87 CAL. L. REV. 269, 300 (1999) (“Here, the court need only
conclude that the software failed because the program was actually built deficiently; that
the execution of an admittedly reasonable software design was flawed.”).
213. That does not mean that the design is necessarily set in stone when it gets to the
programmers.  Indeed, there is a feedback mechanism built into most software projects—if
the programmers determine that there is a problem with the design, this information is
conveyed to the designers and may result in changes made to the design document itself—
which is then used by the coders to develop the software.
214. One court explained the job of a skilled programmer as a clerical function: “To a
skilled programmer, the conversion of known input, known output, the mathematical ex-
pressions needed and the methods of transferring those expressions into computer lan-
guage is necessarily a mere clerical function . . . .  [T]he programmer, no matter how
talented, does not express creativity, imagination, independent thought and uniqueness.”
Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 577–78 (D. Mass. 1985); see also In re Sherwood, 613
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A. Software as a “Product”
Product liability law applies to “products.”  Is computer software a
product or a service?215  In the early, non-software case of La Rossa v.
Scientific Design Co., a court rejected a claim for strict liability for pro-
fessional services on the grounds that
[t]here is no mass production of goods or a large body of
distant consumers whom it would be unfair to require to
trace the article they used along the channels of trade to the
original manufacturer and there to pinpoint an act of negli-
gence remote from their knowledge and even from their
ability to inquire.216
While the case did not directly address the software industry as it
existed in 1968 (the year of the court’s decision), the reasoning of the
court for not applying strict liability to professional services mirrored
the primitive state of the software industry at that time.  There were
no mass-marketed software products in 1968.  Indeed, the personal
computer market did not have its beginnings until the mid-1970s with
the introduction of the Apple I and MITS Altair 8800.217  In 1968, the
computer industry was dominated by a handful of large mainframe
computers located at government installations, universities, and large
corporations.218  Software was either custom made or heavily custom-
ized for each installation, and the customer dealt directly with the ven-
dor, who generally provided the hardware, software, and all
maintenance and support services.  There was generally a direct, con-
tractual relationship between the vendor and the customer.  Thus,
there was no need to extend product liability law to computer
software.
Today, operating systems like Microsoft’s Windows and security
software like Symantec’s Norton Firewall are mass produced and are
F.2d 809, 816–17 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (noting that writing a computer program can require a
range of skills, from inventiveness to mere clerical skill).
215. Bruce Schneier supports the consideration of computer software as a product, stat-
ing: “Legislatures could impose liability on the computer industry, by forcing software
manufacturers to live with the same product liability laws that affect other industries.  If
software manufacturers produced a defective product, they would be liable for damages.”
Schneier, Liability, supra note 50. R
216. 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1968).
217. See The MITS Altair 8800 and Apple I, http://www.csif.cs.ucdavis.edu/~csclub/mu-
seum/items/altair_8800_apple_1.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (describing the two
machines).
218. See, e.g., Computer Sciences Corp., Our History, http://www.softwarehistory.org/
history/d_60s.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
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distributed to a “large body of distant consumers.”219  These critical
software packages are not custom crafted by a few individuals working
in anonymity in their basement or garage.  They are prepared by
teams of hundreds of highly trained and skilled programmers who are
carefully selected by their employers for their levels of expertise.
Their programming is routinized, scrutinized, and supervised by ex-
perienced software development managers, who themselves are highly
trained to perform their supervisory role.
In the almost four decades since the La Rossa decision, the
software industry has evolved and matured to a point that, at least with
regard to operating system and security software, it would not be un-
reasonable or unfair to hold software vendors responsible for defects
to the same extent the courts hold other product designers responsi-
ble for defects in their products.220  As noted in a recent government
study: “Software code that is not well-designed from a security perspec-
tive is more likely than well-designed code to have weaknesses that
could be exploited . . . .  [C]ode can be designed so as to minimize
such vulnerabilities, and well-developed procedures have been estab-
lished to accomplish this goal.”221
While a majority of courts have held that software is a good222 for
the application of the U.C.C.223 and taxation,224 that does not mean
that software is necessarily a product for the application of product lia-
bility law.225  Nor does the fact that a number of courts have held that
219. Cf. supra note 216 and accompanying text. R
220. See Schneier, Liability, supra note 50 (“Today Firestone can produce a tire with a R
single systemic flaw and they’re liable, but Microsoft can produce an operating system with
multiple systemic flaws discovered per week and not be liable.  This makes no sense, and
it’s the primary reason security is so bad today.”).
221. CRS, supra note 17, at 15. R
222. See supra Part III.C.
223. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. R
224. See, e.g., Comshare Inc. v. U.S., 27 F.3d 1142, 1149 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that
Comshare was entitled to the “tangible property” tax credit because “the intangible infor-
mation on Comshare’s master source code tapes and discs could not exist in usable form
without the tangible medium”).
225. James v. Meow Media, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 2d 798, 810 (W.D. Ky. 2000); see THIRD
RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 19, Reporter’s Notes to cmt. d (stating that courts “may R
draw an analogy between the treatment of software under the Uniform Commercial Code
and under products liability law” when they must decide whether to apply strict liability to
computer software, and explaining that “[u]nder the Code, software that is mass-marketed
is considered a good.  However, software that was developed specifically for the customer is
a service.”) (citations omitted). But see Hines v. JMJ Constr. Co., No. CV92-506329, 1993
WL 7269, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 11, 1993) (adopting the U.C.C.’s definition of
“goods” as the definition of “product”).
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software and data are “tangible property” for one purpose226 mean
that they are necessarily a “product” under product liability law. The
Third Restatement provides that:
[a] product is tangible personal property distributed com-
mercially for use or consumption.  Other items, such as real
property and electricity, are products when the context of
their distribution and use is sufficiently analogous to the dis-
tribution and use of tangible personal property that it is ap-
propriate to apply the rules stated in this Restatement.227
The Third Restatement makes clear that the definition is not in-
tended to be fixed, and “in every instance it is for the court to deter-
mine as a matter of law whether something is, or is not, a product.”228
Some states have modified the Restatement definition, arguably bring-
ing software within the definition of a “product.”  For example, the
Ohio statute defines a product as “any object, substance, mixture, or
raw material that constitutes tangible personal property and that satis-
fies all of the following: (i) . . . capable of delivery itself . . . [;] (ii) . . .
produced, manufactured, or supplied for introduction into trade or
commerce . . . [; and] (iii) . . . intended for sale or lease to persons for
commercial or personal use.”229  The issue in these situations will be
whether computer software is “tangible personal property.”
226. MW Mfrs., Inc. v. Friedman Corp., No. 97-C-8319, 1998 WL 417501, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
July 21, 1998) (holding in tort action that software was tangible property because “[t]he
end result that Plaintiff sought was a product (a software package) with certain identifiable
capabilities”); accord Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Mobile, 696 So. 2d 290, 291 (Ala. 1996)
(holding that software was tangible personal property, the sale of which was subject to
gross receipts tax); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Generic Bus. Solutions, Inc., CIV. A. No. 9908,
1990 WL 3665, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 16, 1990) (“It is my view that documents or other
physical objects containing confidential information, as well as computer disks or tapes
containing software are tangible and thus able to be replevied.”); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Barthelemy, 643 So. 2d 1240, 1245 (La. 1994) (“[A]s computer software became more
prevalent in society, and as courts’ knowledge and understanding of computer software
grew, later cases saw a shift in courts’ attitudes towards the taxability of computer software,
and courts began holding computer software to be tangible for sales, use and property tax
purposes.”); Retail Sys., Inc. v. CNA Ins. Cos., 469 N.W.2d 735, 737–38 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that computer tape and information contained on the tape were tangible
property under a general liability provision limiting coverage to physical injury or destruc-
tion of tangible property).
227. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 19(a). R
228. Id. cmt. a.
229. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.71(A)(12)(a) (LexisNexis 2005); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-102(5) (2000) (defining a “product” as “any tangible object or goods pro-
duced”); Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 102(C), 44 Fed. Reg. 62714 (Oct. 31,
1979) (defining a “product” as “any object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery
either as an assembled whole or as a component part or parts, and produced for introduc-
tion into trade or commerce”).
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In America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., AOL was
sued by a group of disgruntled users who claimed that AOL 5.0 dam-
aged their computer systems.230  AOL brought suit against its insurer
to force it to defend AOL under their insurance policy.231  The insur-
ance policy required St. Paul to cover and defend AOL in claims for
“property damage,” defined as “physical damage to tangible property
of others, including all resulting loss of use of that property; or loss of
use of tangible property of others that isn’t physically damaged.”232
The complaint alleged that AOL 5.0 “damaged [consumers’]
software, damaged their data, damaged their computers’ operating
systems, and caused the loss of data and the loss of use of the com-
puters.”233  AOL contended that computer data, software, and system
were tangible property, because they are “capable of being real-
ized.”234  St. Paul argued that computer data and the like are not tan-
gible property because “they constitute property that one cannot
touch.”235  The court agreed with the insurance company, holding
that “the plain and ordinary meaning of the word tangible is some-
thing that is capable of being touched or perceptible to the senses.
Computer data, software, and systems do not have or possess physical
form and are therefore not tangible property as understood by the
Policy.”236
However, in Retail Systems, Inc. v. CNA Insurance Cos.,237 a Minne-
sota state court reached the opposite result.  In that case, a computer
consultant filed a declaratory judgment action against its insurer seek-
ing a declaration that its general liability policy provided coverage for
the loss of a client’s computer tape and data and that the insurer was
required to defend him against the client’s action for damages.238
Finding that the data constituted tangible personal property, the
court said: “The data on the tape was of permanent value and was
integrated completely with the physical property of the tape.  Like a
motion picture, where the information and the celluloid medium are
230. 207 F. Supp. 2d 459, 461 (E.D. Va. 2002).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 462–63 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
233. Id. at 466.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 467; accord State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midwest Computers & More,
147 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1116 (W.D. Okla. 2001) (“[C]omputer data cannot be touched,
held, or sensed by the human mind; it has no physical substance.  It is not tangible
property.”).
237. 469 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
238. Id. at 736–37.
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integrated, so too were the tape and data integrated at the moment
the tape was lost.”239
In a series of cases, courts have held that certain types of informa-
tion will be deemed products, and that product liability law will apply
to errors in such information.240  In Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co.,241 inac-
curacies in the information used to create aeronautical charts caused
a fatal airplane crash.242  The court held that because the charts were
mass-produced and because purchasers substantially relied upon
them without making alterations to them, the information was a prod-
uct for strict liability purposes.243  The court held that the publisher
had a “special responsibility, as seller, to insure that consumers will
not be injured by the use of the charts . . . .  This special responsibility
lies upon Jeppesen in its role as designer, seller and manufacturer.”244
In Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co.,245 a California state court was
faced with the same issue.  Reversing a trial court ruling that the de-
fendant’s charts were not products, the appellate court said:
[The trial court] explained that it believed strict liability
principles are applicable only to items whose physical
properties render them innately dangerous, e.g., mechanical
devices, explosives, combustible or flammable materials, etc.
This belief was erroneous . . . .  [A]lthough a sheet of paper
might not be dangerous, per se, it would be difficult indeed
to conceive of a salable commodity with more inherent lethal
potential than an aid to aircraft navigation that, contrary to
its own design standards, fails to list the highest land mass
immediately surrounding a landing site.246
239. Id. at 737.
240. As stated in the Third Restatement: “One area in which some courts have imposed
strict products liability involves false information contained in maps and navigational
charts.  In that context the falsity of the factual information is unambiguous and more akin
to a classic product defect.” THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 19 cmt. d. R
241. 707 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1983).
242. Id. at 672–73.
243. Id. at 676–77.  “Though a ‘product’ may not include mere provision of architec-
tural design plans or any similar form of data supplied under individually tailored service
arrangements, the mass production and marketing of these charts requires Jeppesen to
bear the costs of accidents that are proximately caused by defects in the charts.” Id. at 677
(citation omitted).
244. Id. at 677; see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jeppesen & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 341–43
(9th Cir. 1981) (assuming that the Federal Aviation Administration’s flight data contained
on the charts was a “product” for strict liability purposes).
245. 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
246. Id. at 71–72 (citations omitted).
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The fact that a product requires “some professional skill” does
not preclude the application of strict product liability.247  “If suitable
for mass marketing, the information is in some sense a fungible good
for which the manufacturer placing it on the market must assume re-
sponsibility.”248  “Jeppesen mass produced and distributed thousands
of charts on the aviation market.  Implicit in their presence on the
market was the representation that the purchaser could rely on their
information safely. Exposing defendant Jeppesen’s conduct to strict
products liability is thus entirely appropriate.”249
Citing the various Jeppesen decisions finding a publisher liable for
erroneous data incorporated into its aeronautical charts, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s
Sons, held that those cases did not stand for the proposition that ideas
and expressions alone were “products.”250  Instead, the court distin-
guished the characterization of the aeronautical charts as products for
strict liability purposes, stating that “[a]eronautical charts are highly
technical tools.  They are graphic depictions of technical, mechanical
data.”251  The court then continued, admittedly in dictum, to state:
“Computer software that fails to yield the result for which it was de-
signed may be another”252—that is, may be a product for strict liability
purposes.  The court in Winter further surmised that:
[U]nder products liability law, the injury does not have to be
caused by impact from the physical properties of the item.
In other words, the injury does not have to result because a
compass explodes in your hand, but can result because the
compass malfunctions and leads you over a cliff.253
Where the definition of “product” does not provide an unequivo-
cal answer in a particular case, the Third Restatement indicates that the
determination254 should be reached
247. Halstead v. U.S., 535 F. Supp. 782, 791 (D. Conn. 1982).  This case involved the
same aeronautical charts that were at issue in Jeppesen. Id. at 784–85.
248. Id. at 791.
249. Id.; accord Brocklesby v. U.S., 767 F.2d 1288, 1294–96 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that
a graphic instrument approach chart was a “product” subject to strict liability law).
250. Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1036 n.4.  The Reporter’s Notes of the Third Restatement of Torts note that
Winter is a leading case in the field. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 19, Re- R
porter’s Notes to cmt. d.
254. Determining whether something is a “product” is an issue of law for the court to
decide. E.g., Johnson v. Murph Metals, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 246, 249 (N.D. Tex. 1983); see
also THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 19, Reporter’s Notes to cmt. d. R
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in light of the public policies behind the imposition of strict
liability in tort.  Some of the policy considerations include:
(1) the public interest in life and health; (2) the invitations
and solicitations of the manufacturer to purchase the prod-
uct; (3) the justice of imposing the loss on the manufacturer
who created the risk and reaped the profit; (4) the superior
ability of the commercial enterprise to distribute the risk of
injury as a cost of doing business; (5) the disparity in position
and bargaining power that forces the consumer to depend
entirely on the manufacturer; (6) the difficulty in requiring
the injured party to trace back along the channel of trade to
the source of the defect in order to prove negligence; and
(7) whether the product is in the stream of commerce.255
While these factors may not argue in favor of finding all software
to be products, they strongly favor finding software that is supposed to
provide security for corporate and government computer systems to
be a product for product liability purposes.
B. Insecure Software as a Design Defect
Under the Third Restatement, a negligence standard is to be ap-
plied in design defect claims.  The Third Restatement adopts the “risk-
utility” analysis as the sole test for determining design defectiveness.256
This test is based on the Learned Hand formula (B < PL) set forth in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co.257  Under that formula, the court will
look at the burden (cost) to the vendor of making its product less
defective, and balance that burden against the probability of injury to
the user from using that defective product multiplied by the magni-
tude of the injury that the user may suffer as a result of the defect.258
It does not take an expert to understand that defects in software
can and often do lead to massive damages to software users and third
parties as a result of hackers, system crashes, and other manifestations
of those defects.259  This is particularly true in the area of system se-
curity, where the potential injury may be incalculable.  How do you
put a price tag on the damage caused by a hacker shutting down an
255. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 19, Reporter’s Notes to cmt. a. R
256. Id. § 2(b) & cmt. d.
257. 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
258. See id. Some argue that “[t]he technical burden involved with security evaluations
of complex systems weighs in favor of [software vendors] bearing the brunt of implement-
ing security in product design.”  Kenneally, supra note 51, at 67. R
259. It was reported that in a single month, October 2003, hackers caused over $1 bil-
lion in damages to computer systems. See Tim Lemke, Spam Harmed Economy More Than
Hackers, Viruses, Report Shows, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2003.
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air traffic control system during a blizzard, or a terrorist causing a
water treatment plant to over-chlorinate the drinking supply of a ma-
jor city and poisoning its citizens?  These doomsday scenarios (and
countless others) are all too real when you consider how much com-
panies, government agencies, and individuals rely on software-con-
trolled devices to protect and assist them in their daily duties.260
With regard to a product’s design, negligence law requires a man-
ufacturer to “exercise reasonable care in a variety of different func-
tions.”261  With security-related software, the vendor’s responsibilities
would include carefully formulating the design of the software to pre-
vent vulnerabilities that can be exploited by hackers and other third
parties, properly implementing the design in code, thoroughly testing
the code to expose any vulnerabilities, and revising the code to re-
move the vulnerabilities before releasing the software to the public.262
Under the Third Restatement, the analysis focuses on whether there
was a “reasonable alternative design” available.263  It does not require
the vendor to rid its software of every vulnerability.  Whether a “rea-
sonable alternative design” for any given operating system or security
application is available is a fact-specific inquiry and will differ for each
software product at issue.  But experience has shown that what is often
needed for software containing security-related flaws is not an exten-
sive redesign of the entire software package, but merely the rewriting
of a small portion of the code to remove the vulnerability.
C. Insecure Software as a Manufacturing Defect
Under the Third Restatement, strict liability continues to apply to
cases involving manufacturing defects.  Manufacturers are “obliged to
keep abreast of any scientific discoveries and are presumed to know
the results of all such advances.”264  Further, they “bear the duty to
260. See generally CRITICAL INFORMATION, supra note 18. R
261. OWEN, supra note 110, § 2.1, at 62.  These functions include: R
that the general product concept be conceived and formulated carefully for its
foreseeable uses and abuses; that proper attention be devoted to selecting appro-
priate materials and components to be assembled together into the finished prod-
uct; that safety devices for the product’s expected uses be adopted as appropriate;
and that prototypes of the product be tested, as appropriate, in contexts duplicat-
ing the harshest circumstances of expected use.
Id.
262. “[A] study by Andrew Jacquith found that seventy percent of security weaknesses
resulted from design flaws that could have been anticipated by a greater emphasis on se-
curity.”  Skibell, supra note 49, at 112. R
263. See supra notes 207–209 and accompanying text. R
264. Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456, 461 (5th Cir. 1985).
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fully test their products to uncover all scientifically discoverable dan-
gers before the products are sold.”265
Those supporting the application of strict liability to defective
software argue that the vendor should be held liable because (i) the
vendor is in the best position to prevent software vulnerabilities; (ii)
the vendor will be motivated to develop secure software; (iii) the ven-
dor can spread the cost of providing secure software by increasing the
price of its products; and (iv) the vendor will “treat the burden of . . .
injury as a cost of production to be covered by liability insurance.”266
Over the last twenty years, there have been calls to impose strict
product liability on software vendors for defects in their products,267
but to no avail.  To date, there are no reported decisions in the
United States holding a software vendor liable under a strict liability
theory.
Opponents of strict liability for software vulnerabilities argue that
the spectre of potentially massive damage awards would inhibit inno-
vation and cause vendors to avoid developing products in these ar-
eas.268  They also point out that the user of their software is in a better
position to evaluate the risks it faces if there is a business interrup-
tion—whether due to software vulnerabilities or other causes—and to
insure against such eventualities.269  Vendors also point out that in
complex software products defects are inevitable270 and cannot be
265. Id.
266. Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 677 (2d Cir. 1983).
267. See, e.g., Patrick E. Bradley & Jennifer R. Smith, Liability Issues Regarding Defects in
Software, 19 PRODUCT LIABILITY L. & STRATEGY, Nov. 2000, at 5, 5; Michael R. Maule, Apply-
ing Strict Products Liability to Computer Software, 27 TULSA L.J. 735, 737 (1992) (arguing that
strict products liability of computer software manufacturers is desirable); Lori A. Weber,
Note, Bad Bytes: The Application of Strict Products Liability to Computer Software, 66 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 469, 471 (1992) (advocating for a fact-specific inquiry for determining whether to
apply strict liability in computer software cases). Contra Patrick T. Miyaki, Comment, Com-
puter Software Defects: Should Computer Software Manufacturers Be Held Strictly Liable for Computer
Software Defects?, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 121, 122–23 (1992) (conclud-
ing that strict liability can, but should not, be applied against computer software
manufacturers).
268. See Steve Lohr, Product Liability Lawsuits Are New Threat to Microsoft, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
6, 2003, at C2 (reporting that software executives believe that the imposition of product
liability lawsuits “would chill innovations and undermine the competitiveness of American
companies”).
269. See Statement of Robert Holleyman, President and CEO of the Business Software
Alliance Before the House of Representatives Committee on Science, reprinted at http://
www.house.gov/science/holleyman_09-24.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
270. See, e.g., Skibell, supra note 49, at 110. R
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 46 11-MAR-08 9:31
470 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:425
prevented even by using today’s software development “best
practices.”271
The issue of whether the vendor, for any given software package,
should be held strictly liable for a manufacturing defect should not
depend on generalized public policy arguments, but instead should
result from an analysis of the vendor’s coding and testing methodolo-
gies and whether they comport with the general legal rules applicable
to product liability law.
D. Difficulties in Applying Product Liability Law
1. Economic Loss Rule
The most significant impediment to the use of strict product lia-
bility law to recover damages caused by insecure software is the “eco-
nomic loss rule [which] generally bars claims in tort for economic
losses, limiting recovery for such losses to the law of contract.”272  The
Third Restatement defines economic losses273 and indicates that because
“products liability law lies at the boundary between tort and contract,”
some forms of loss, including pure economic loss, “are more appropri-
ately assigned to contract law and the remedies set forth in Articles 2
and 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code.”274
In most cases involving defective software, typical losses suffered
by a plaintiff will involve the loss or corruption of data, lost employee
time, or the cost of remediation.275  Traditionally, “[s]uch losses fall
within the economic loss doctrine and cannot be recovered in a prod-
271. See Lohr, supra note 268; Michael C. Gemignani, Product Liability and Software, 8 R
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 173, 191 (1981) (“[T]esting . . . can never prove the
absence of fatal flaws in software.  Testing can at best establish that the program is not
likely to fail under certain uses.”).
272. Am. Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 207 F. Supp. 2d 459, 470 (E.D. Va.
2002); see also Word Mgmt. Corp. v. AT&T Info. Sys., Inc., 525 N.Y.S.2d 433, 435–36 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988) (concluding that if a transaction is deemed to be a sale of goods and the
recovery sought is purely economic relief, the U.C.C. applies rather than negligence or
strict products liability).  For a discussion of the economic loss rule as it applies to negli-
gence claims, see infra Part II.F.2.
273. The Third Restatement states:
harm to persons or property includes economic loss if caused by harm to:
(a) the plaintiff’s person; or
(b) the person of another when harm to the other interferes with an interest
of the plaintiff protected by tort law; or
(c) the plaintiff’s property other than the defective product itself.
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 21. R
274. Id. cmt. a.
275. Neuburger & Garde, supra note 106, at 11. R
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uct liability action”276 because they “stem from the alleged failure of
the computer system to perform as expected and not from injury to
another person or property.”277
Arguments can be made, however, that some claims arising from
the failure of security software should be recoverable despite the eco-
nomic loss rule.278  For example, a company’s reputation “is an inter-
est protected by tort law . . . .”279  Additionally, the data contained in
the computer is property separate and apart from the software itself.
2. Contractual Disclaimers and Limitations on Liability
Courts have held that the U.C.C. generally is intended to displace
tort liability with regard to property damages, at least in the commer-
cial context.280  This rule remains a significant impediment to the ap-
plication of product liability law in the security software context.
IV. APPLYING PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE LAW TO INSECURE
SOFTWARE
Under the doctrine of professional malpractice, one who is
deemed a professional will owe the other party a duty to act not just as a
reasonable person under the circumstances, as required by negli-
gence law, but to meet a higher standard—that of a professional in
that particular field.281  The concept of professional liability has gen-
erally been applied to those who by virtue of specific training and li-
censing are deemed to have a level of skills higher than that of non-
professionals.282
276. Id.; see also Affiliates for Evaluation & Therapy, Inc. v. Viasyn Corp., 500 S.2d 688,
693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that because plaintiff suffered solely economic
losses from a malfunctioning computer, a products liability action could not stand).
277. Krider Pharmacy & Gifts, Inc. v. Medi-Care Data Sys., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 221, 226
(E.D. Wis. 1992); see also Fishbein v. Corel Corp., No. 230-1995, 1996 WL 895317, at *4–5
(Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 12, 1996).
278. See, e.g., Spagnol Enters., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 568 A.2d 948, 951–52 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that warranty claims may apply even when loss from a product
defect is purely economic).
279. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 21 cmt. c, illus. 1 (stating that an individ- R
ual professional reputation is an interest protected by tort law).
280. See, e.g., Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 30 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 1994)
(noting that the economic loss doctrine “bars recovery under the tort theories of negli-
gence or strict liability for economic losses . . . .”); see also infra Part II.F.3.
281. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. R
282. Id. Those persons falling within the realm of professional responsibility include
doctors, lawyers, dentists, architects, accountants, and similarly licensed workers. See STU-
ART M. SPEISER ET AL., 4 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS 303–06 (1987) (enumerating the
professions where malpractice liability has been imposed).
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To date, courts have been reluctant to hold computer designers
or programmers to the higher standard of professionals due to the
lack of “established educational standards or regulations governing
the performance of software programmers and developers, and [be-
cause] they are not licensed as professionals.”283  Early cases declined
to create a tort “premised upon a theory of elevated responsibility on
the part of those who render computer sales and services.”284  In Hos-
pital Computer Systems, Inc. v. Staten Island Hospital, for example, the
court refused to hold a computer programmer to a professional stan-
dard because:
A profession is not a business.  It is distinguished by the re-
quirements of extensive formal training and learning, admis-
sion to practice by a qualifying licensure, a code of ethics
imposing standards qualitatively and extensively beyond
those that prevail or are tolerated in the marketplace, a sys-
tem for discipline of its members for violation of the code of
ethics, a duty to subordinate financial reward to social re-
sponsibility, and, notably, an obligation on its members, even
in non-professional matters, to conduct themselves as mem-
bers of a learned, disciplined, and honorable occupation.285
Other courts have refused to recognize computer programmers
and consultants as professionals, because “[t]o lift the theory of mal-
practice from its narrow origin of personal, professional services to a
lay patient or client and apply it to the law of commercial contracts
would obfuscate the necessary boundaries of these two areas of
law.”286
The early cases were based on the fact that the software industry
was in its infancy, and
283. Levy & Bell, supra note 155, at 10. R
284. Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l Cash Register Corp., 479 F. Supp. 738, 740–41 n.1 (D.N.J.
1979), aff’d in part, remanded in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Simply
because an activity is technically complex and important to the business community does
not mean that greater potential liability must attach.”); see also Triangle Underwriters, Inc.
v. Honeywell, Inc., 604 F.2d 737, 745–46 (2d Cir. 1979) (declining to consider sellers or
manufacturers of computer machinery as “members of the learned professions”); Atkins
Nutritionals, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 754 N.Y.S.2d 320, 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (re-
fusing to recognize claim of professional malpractice by computer consultants); Richard A.
Rosenblatt & Co. v. Davidge Data Sys. Corp., 743 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(same).
285. Hosp. Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351, 1361 (D.N.J.
1992); see also Rogers Merch., Inc. v. Bojangles’ Corp., No. 87-C-5001, 1989 WL 6391, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 1989) (holding that tort liability does not attach to every activity whose
practitioners call themselves professionals).
286. Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. China Semiconductor Co., 867 F. Supp. 1173,
1182–83 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
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1. Software was generally custom-developed for indi-
vidual clients and not mass-produced;
2. Software vendors were small, cottage-type opera-
tions and not major corporations;
3. Software development was more of an art than a sci-
ence; there was little in the way of organized education for
developers and there were no standardized methods for de-
veloping software;
4. All software had “bugs” and there was no effective
means of preventing bugs; and
5. Computers were useful, but not indispensable, tools
for businesses.
Advances in software development methodology, education and
standards, the emergence of major software corporations (such as
Microsoft), and the required use of software in critical applications
(e.g., network security, medical technology, nuclear reactor controls,
weapon systems) have changed the landscape to the point that it may
be time to rethink the logic behind these earlier cases and to establish
a framework within which software vendors could be held liable as
professionals for distributing insecure software.
Many software developers, particularly those at companies devel-
oping secure software, have received extensive training in the use of
certain programming and testing techniques.287  They have had to
pass rigorous tests to become “certified.”288  In doing so, the certifying
organization has established that these programmers have reached a
level of expertise not held by general programmers.  While this is not
identical to the licensing requirements of state licensing boards such
as state bar associations or medical boards, it may be sufficient to jus-
tify holding these certified developers to a higher, professional stan-
dard, particularly where their certifications relate to secure software
development.
287. Today, a majority of colleges and universities have their Computer Science degrees
accredited by the Computer Sciences Accreditation Commission (CSAS)/Computing Sci-
ences Accreditation Board (CSAB).  Computing Sciences Accreditation Board, http://
www.csab.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2008); Accreditation Board of Engineering and Technol-
ogy (ABET), http://www.abet.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
288. For example, the International Information Systems Security Certification Consor-
tium promotes the Certification for Information System Security Professional (CISSP) cer-
tification examination.  CISSP.com, http://cissp.com (last visited Feb. 20, 2008); see also
Patricia Haney DiRuggiero, Note, The Professionalism of Computer Practitioners: A Case for Certi-
fication, 25 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1139, 1151, 1151 n.63, 1161 (1991) (advocating certification
of computer programmers and suggesting that the certificate program of the Institute for
Certification of Computer Professionals (ICCP) provides a logical model).
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In Diversified Graphics, Ltd. v. Groves, for example, the plaintiff
hired a large accounting firm to help it locate a turnkey computer
system.289  When the chosen system proved inadequate for the com-
pany’s needs, the company sued.290  The court ruled that the account-
ing firm should be held to the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants’ Management Advisory Service Practice Standards, which
the firm had incorporated into its guidelines for internal use.291
While the court refused to acknowledge a cause of action for com-
puter malpractice, by holding the accounting firm to the AICPA stan-
dards, it achieved essentially the same result.
In Data Processing Services, Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., the plaintiff
claimed that the defendant was negligent in designing an accounting
and data processing software system.292  The state appellate court
stated in dictum that “[t]hose who hold themselves out to the world as
possessing skill and qualifications in their respective trades or profes-
sions impliedly represent they possess the skill and will exhibit the
diligence ordinarily possessed by well informed members of the trade
or profession.”293  The court concluded that “[t]he situation here is
more analogous to a client seeking a lawyer’s advice or a patient seek-
ing medical treatment for a particular ailment than it is to a customer
buying seed corn, soap, or cam shafts.”294
While there is a wide range of experience and expertise exhibited
by computer software designers and programmers, those who develop
operating systems and security software are generally at the higher
end of the profession in terms of education, training, and experience.
Although it is unlikely that a single, professional standard can or
should be deemed to exist for those who design or write all types of
software—from the mundane to the sublime—it is certainly possible
to hold programmers who write critical software, such as operating
systems and security software, to a higher standard than those who
write less critical code such as word processors and videogames.
One problem with attempting to apply malpractice principles to
software developers is the fact that most software today is developed by
teams, often consisting of hundreds of people, and not just a single
professional.  These teams include software analysts, programmers,
289. 868 F.2d 293, 294–95 (8th Cir. 1989).
290. Id. at 295.
291. Id. at 296–97.
292. Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. L.H. Smith Oil Corp., 492 N.E.2d 314, 316 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986).
293. Id. at 319.
294. Id.
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project managers, quality assurance engineers, technical writers, test
engineers, and more.  While many of these people may have the edu-
cational training and certifications indicative of a professional, others
will not.  How does a plaintiff establish that the defects in the software
were due to the malpractice of the “professionals” who worked on the
product and not those who would be deemed non-professionals?295
Another impediment to the application of malpractice to
software development is the fact that “when an action for malpractice
is product-oriented, a plaintiff cannot sue the professional in tort.”296
To the extent that the software is considered a product, malpractice
principles will not apply.
V. THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON
VENDOR LIABILITY
In the end, a primary goal of SOX will be more secured
networks . . . .297
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act298 (SOX) was enacted to ensure the ac-
curacy of, and restore investor confidence in, the financial statements
provided by corporations to government regulators, such as the Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC).299  It was enacted in response
to several high-profile accounting scandals involving Enron,
Worldcom (MCI), Global Crossings, and Tyco International that re-
sulted in billions of dollars in corporate and investor losses.300
SOX applies to both U.S. publicly owned corporations (and their
wholly owned subsidiaries) and all foreign publicly owned corpora-
tions whose shares are registered with the SEC.301  The SEC enforces
295. For example, in Pezzillo v. General Telephone & Electronics Information Systems., Inc.,
414 F. Supp. 1257, 1264–66, 1268–70 (M.D. Tenn. 1976), aff’d per curiam, 572 F.2d 1189
(6th Cir. 1978), the court held that computer programmers are not employed in a profes-
sional capacity as that term is used in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.  The court
analogized the duties performed by computer programmers to those of a draftsman em-
ployed by an architect, stating that both the draftsman and the programmer generally
performed mechanical functions, while architects and computer analysts generally acted as
professionals. Id. at 1264–65.
296. Analysts Int’l Corp. v. Recycled Paper Prods., Inc., No. 85-C-8637, 1987 WL 12917,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 1987) (citing Kishwaukee Cmty. Servs. Ctr. v. Hosp. Bldg. & Equip.
Co., 638 F. Supp. 1492, 1504 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).
297. Anne Saita, Sarbanes-Oxley Act: You Ready Yet?, SEARCHSECURITY.COM, Oct. 6, 2004,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/0,289142,sid14_gci1012386,00.
html.
298. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in
Titles 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 of the U.S.C.).
299. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text. R
300. Id.
301. 15 U.S.C. § 7201(7) (Supp. IV 2006); Saita, supra note 297. R
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the Act.302  The Act requires that CEOs and CFOs certify that reports
periodically filed with the SEC fairly present the company’s financial
condition.303
SOX does not specify the processes or systems a public company
must undertake to comply with the Act.  In general, the company
needs to install multiple security technologies, including firewalls, in-
trusion detection systems, anti-virus software, and so forth.304  But
more is required.  SOX “is subject to such broad interpretation as to
make its implementation and enforcement in the IT world a
nightmare.”305
Pursuant to the Act, the SEC created the Public Company Ac-
counting Oversight Board (PCAOB)306 to oversee public company au-
ditors, protect investors, and insure that auditors conduct informative,
fair, and independent audits.307  The PCAOB was given the task of
developing corporate compliance requirements.308  It developed and
issued its Proposed Accounting Standards,309 which provide addi-
tional guidance for assessing compliance with SOX.310
The Act has many sections, but those that most directly impact
software and system security issues are Section 302 (making corporate
officers and directors personally liable for misreporting financial in-
formation)311 and Section 404 (requiring corporate officers, direc-
tors, and independent auditors to attest annually to the accuracy of
the internal financial controls).312
302. 15 U.S.C. § 7202.
303. Id. § 7241.
304. See John De Santis, Why Network Security Should Go Further Than Sarbanes-Oxley, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Dec. 4, 2003, http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/
story/0,10801,87704.00.html (discussing the requirements of SOX and its implications for
computer companies).
305. Id.
306. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a).  For further information on the PCAOB, see The Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Board, http://www.pcaobus.org (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
307. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a).
308. Id. § 7211(c).
309. Press Release, PCAOB, Release No. 2004-001: An Audit of Internal Control Over
Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements
(Mar. 9, 2004), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/docket_008/2004-03-09_release
_2004-001-all.pdf [hereinafter PCAOB Release No. 2004-001].
310. The Audit Standard “establishes requirements and provides directions that apply
when an auditor is engaged to audit both a company’s financial statements and manage-
ment’s assessment of the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting.” Id. at
A-5.
311. 15 U.S.C. § 7241.
312. Id. § 7262.
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The cost of compliance with the Act is enormous.  It is estimated
that U.S. public companies spent about $5.5 billion in 2004 to comply
with the Act, and an additional $5.8 billion in 2005.313
A. Section 302
Section 302 of the Act states that the CEO and CFO are directly
responsible for maintaining the company’s internal control structure
and for the accuracy, documentation, and submission of all financial
reports to the SEC.314  They must personally certify that the financial
reports are accurate and complete.315
Internal control is not “one-size-fits-all,” and the nature and
extent of controls that are necessary depend, to a great ex-
tent, on the size and complexity of the company.  Large,
complex, multi-national companies, for example, are likely
to need extensive and sophisticated internal control
systems.316
The company’s financial reports cannot contain any misrepresen-
tations and the information in the report must be “fairly pre-
sent[ed].”317  The CEO and CFO must report any significant
deficiencies in the company’s internal accounting controls,318 or any
fraud involving the management of the audit committee, and must
indicate any material changes in internal accounting controls.319
B. Section 404
Section 404 of the Act requires that the management of public
companies assess the effectiveness of the company’s internal controls
over financial reporting and certify in the annual report that those
313. Eric Bellman, Tracking the Numbers / Outside Audit: One More Cost of Sarbanes-Oxley:
Outsourcing to India, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2005, at C1; see also Alix Nyberg Stuart, Sticker
Shock, CFO MAG., Sept. 1, 2003, available at http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cfm/301
0299?f=options (indicating that 48% of 200 public companies surveyed will spend at least
$500,000 on Sarbanes-Oxley compliance).
314. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a).
315. Id.
316. PCAOB Release No. 2004-001, supra note 309, at 9. R
317. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(3).
318. Id. § 7241(a)(5)(A).  Unfortunately, Section 302 does not identify which internal
controls must be assessed, leaving it to business executives to decide.  However, PCAOB,
Release No. 2004-001 states that “[d]etermining which controls should be tested, including
controls over all relevant assertions related to all significant accounts and disclosures in the
financial statements.  Generally, such controls include: . . . information technology general
controls, on which other controls are dependent.”  PCAOB Release No. 2004-001, supra
note 309, at A-21. R
319. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a)(5)(B)(6).
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controls operate effectively and comply with the requirements of the
Act and its related rules and regulations.320  The assessment also must
be reviewed and approved by an outside auditing firm.321  Some law-
yers summarize these sections as requiring management to “look
closely and regularly at all the steps taken to ensure the integrity and
reliability of the company’s financial accounts and tell the public if
there is any ‘material weakness’ in the design or operation of these
steps—thereby hopefully avoiding another Enron-like surprise.”322
One securities commentator notes that Section 404 is the one that
“seems to have caused the biggest headaches.”323
The Act requires the SEC to issue rules requiring publicly held
companies to include in their annual reports an internal control re-
port containing:
1. a statement of management’s responsibility for “es-
tablishing and maintaining an adequate internal control
structure and procedures for financial reporting;”324 and
2. an assessment by management at the end of the
company’s most recent fiscal year “of the effectiveness of the
company’s internal control structure and procedures . . . for
financial reporting.”325
The SEC has issued rules to implement Section 404.326  These
rules provide that the internal controls327 subject to assessment by
management include but are not limited to:
controls over initiating, recording, processing, and recon-
ciling account balances, classes of transactions and disclosure
and related assertions included in the financial statements;
controls related to the initiation and processing of non-rou-
tine and non-systematic transactions; controls related to the
320. Id. § 7262(a).
321. Id. § 7262(b).
322. Michael S. Mensik & Robert Gareis, The Sarbanes-Oxley/Outsourcing Intersection:
An Introduction 1 (Sept. 2004), http://www.bakernet.com/NR/rdonlyres/A3C635C0-05
0C-432F-A30F-3EF65E5D83D1/0/Final_Intersection_SOX.pdf.
323. Saita, supra note 297. R
324. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a).
325. Id.
326. See Management’s Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certi-
fication of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (Securities
and Exchange Commission June 18, 2003) (final rule) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228,
229, 240, 249, 270, and 274) [hereinafter Management’s Report].
327. The rules define internal controls to include “policies and procedures that: . . .
[p]rovide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized
acquisition, use or disposition of the registrant’s assets that could have a material effect on
the financial statements.” Id. at 36,640.
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selection and application of appropriate accounting policies;
and controls related to the prevention, identification, and
detection of fraud.328
Section 404 also requires that every registered public accounting
firm that prepares or issues an audit report on a company’s annual
financial statement attests to, and reports on, the assessment made by
management.329  The Act requires independent auditors to attest to
the integrity of a public company’s financial controls.330
Virtually all financial controls in use today are computer-based
and software-controlled.  These controls include internal control sys-
tems, such as transaction handling and accounting ledgers, and sys-
tems linked to third parties such as banks, trading exchanges, and
clearinghouses.  Any software security breach constitutes a risk to the
company’s internal financial systems, which could prevent compliance
with the requirements of Section 404.  Even if the security breach does
not directly involve the financial systems, any compromise to the com-
pany’s IT system could allow an outsider to access the financial sys-
tem.331  As such, Section 404 requires the company to sufficiently
secure its IT on an enterprise-wide basis so that the independent audi-
tors and corporate executives are willing to attest to the security of the
financial systems.
Control Objectives for Information and related Technology
(COBIT) was developed by the Information Systems Audit Control As-
sociation (ISACA) to provide more specific guidance to companies in
developing and assessing IT controls.332  COBIT addresses internal
controls for thirty-four separate IT processes.333
In March 2004, the PCAOB published its Auditing Standards No. 2,
which specifies the “Internal Control—Integrated Framework
(1992),” a document prepared by the Committee of Sponsoring Orga-
nizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), as the control frame-
328. Id. at 36,643.
329. 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b).
330. Id.
331. See PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 2: An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements, ¶ 75 (Mar. 9,
2004), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/Release-20040308-1.pdf [hereinafter Au-
diting Standard No. 2] (“The nature and characteristics of a company’s use of information
technology in its information system affect the company’s internal control over financial
reporting.”).
332. For further information on COBIT, see ISACA, http://www.isaca.org/cobit (last
visited Feb. 20, 2008).
333. COBIT 4.1 Brochure, available at http://www.isaca.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
Members_and_Leaders/COBIT6/Obtain_COBIT/CobiT4.1_Brochure.pdf.
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work for financial reporting.334 Although not required by SOX, COSO
has quickly become the international standard for managing compli-
ance with the Act.335
Auditing Standard No. 2 instructs auditors to focus on two interre-
lated questions:
1. Was management’s assessment of the internal controls “fairly
stated, in all material respects”?336
2. Did the company, in fact, “maintain[ ], in all material re-
spects, effective internal control over financial reporting”?337
C. The CEO’s Dilemma
What is a CEO to do?  SOX requires that he sign filings with the
SEC that certify that the company’s computer systems are secure and
that the company maintains, in all material respects, effective internal
controls over its financial reporting.  If he’s wrong, he faces potential
prosecution for violations of SOX, with personal fines up to one to
five million dollars and/or imprisonment for up to ten to twenty
years.338
Yet, if the company asks its software vendors, whose products the
company relies upon to provide that security and effective control, to
certify that their systems meet the SOX’s requirements, the vendors
politely decline, mumbling something about how all software has bugs
and the company is not willing to assume the risk that the customer’s
system may be compromised by hackers, cyberterrorists, or perhaps
just a disgruntled ex-employee.
The CEO finds himself between the proverbial rock and a hard
place.  Thus far the SEC has not taken action against any corporate
executives who have signed such an undertaking that later turned out
to be untrue.  Nor have publicly traded companies raised up with a
single voice and demanded better accountability from their vendors.
But we have not yet had a major accounting scandal arising from
software vulnerabilities.
334. Auditing Standard No. 2, supra note 331, ¶ 14. R
335. See Institute of Internal Auditors, Putting COSO’s Theory Into Practice, TONE AT THE
TOP, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.theiia.org/download.cfm?file=42122 (calling
COSO the industry standard for managing SOX compliance).
336. Auditing Standard No. 2, supra note 331, ¶ 167(l). R
337. Id. ¶ 167(m); see also PCAOB Release No. 2004-001, supra note 309, at 7 (noting R
that an attestation of management’s evaluation of internal controls “requires the same
level of work as an audit of internal control over financial reporting . . . .  The auditor,
however, also needs to test the effectiveness of internal control to be satisfied that manage-
ment’s conclusion is correct, and therefore, fairly stated.”).
338. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (Supp. IV 2006).
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VI. SOME ALTERNATIVE AVENUES
The above review of recent developments in tort law indicates
that tort law appears to be moving toward a point where at least some
types of security-related software vulnerabilities will give rise to tort
claims.  However, for the most common forms of injury caused by de-
fective security software—loss of sensitive corporate and third party
data—the economic loss rule will continue to bar most claims.339
And, because most security breaches arise from criminal activities, the
rules relating to superseding causes may prevent many meritorious
tort claims against vendors.340
Because of the urgency of the issue, society cannot wait for the
courts or legislature to change existing law.  As a result, various gov-
ernment agencies and private organizations are looking for alternative
avenues to compel software vendors to increase the security of their
products.
First, the federal government is a key buyer of security software,
acquiring around forty-two percent of all software and computing ser-
vices.341  It has the negotiating clout to force software vendors to offer
specific warranties that their software is secure, with significant mone-
tary penalties if it is not.342  While these warranties would appear on
their face only to benefit the government, forcing vendors to develop
secure software will actually benefit all users, because vendors have
strong business reasons to minimize the number of different versions
of their software being used.  The cost of supporting multiple versions
of a single software package is extremely high.  As a result, if vendors
339. See supra Parts II.F.2, III.D.1.
340. See supra Part II.F.1.
341. Of the total IT security software market of $10 billion in 2004, “Federal agencies
spent $4.2 billion securing the government’s total information technology investment of
approximately $59 billion . . . .” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, FEDERAL INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT ACT (FISMA) 2004 REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at i (2005).
342. See, e.g., Saita, supra note 24 (discussing the influence of the Federal Government in R
creating a new “model contract” under which vendors must deliver software that meets
specific safety requirements); see also Federal Information Systems Management Act
(FISMA) of 2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541–3549 (Supp. IV 2004) (requiring all federal agencies
to follow various security procedures and processes to improve their IT security).  In the
private sector, large corporations are also using their leverage to negotiate meaningful
security-related warranties. See, e.g., Put It in Writing, CSO MAG., Oct. 2002, available at
http://www.csoonline.com/read/100702/writing_528.html (presenting a contract in
which GE used its leverage to include language holding its software vendor accountable for
the quality of the product); Dennis Fisher, Contracts Getting Tough on Security, EWEEK, Apr.
15, 2002, http://www.eweek.com/print_article2/0,1217,a=25494,00.asp (discussing how
large companies are using new language in contracts to hold software companies liable for
any failures of their product).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\67-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 58 11-MAR-08 9:31
482 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 67:425
are forced to provide more secure versions of their software to the
government, it is likely that those versions will be made available to all
licensees.343
Second, the National Academy of Science and others have pro-
posed that Congress enact legislation that “would increase the expo-
sure of software and system vendors and system operators to liability
for system breaches and mandate[ ] reporting of security breaches
that could threaten critical societal functions.”344  While no such legis-
lation has yet been considered, a major corporate failure due to defec-
tive security software might be the impetus needed for such
legislation.
Third, and finally, perhaps one of the most potentially important
developments to date is the approach being taken by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) to address the dangers of computer and
network security failures.
Under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, the agency has a limited man-
date to take action against “unfair [or deceptive] acts or practices.”345
The FTC has begun taking action against software users whose systems
were breached by hackers and third party confidential information
was disclosed.  The first case involved a retailer, BJ’s Wholesale Club,
Inc., whose failure to properly configure its computer system allegedly
allowed thousands of customer records to be accessed by cyber-
criminals who made millions of dollars in fraudulent purchases.346
The FTC accused the retailer of unfair acts or practices due to its al-
legedly negligent conduct.347
BJ’s entered into a consent decree under which it agreed to “es-
tablish and implement, and thereafter maintain, a comprehensive in-
formation security program that is reasonably designed to protect the
343. Statement of Bruce Schneier, Founder and Chief Technical Officer, Counterpane
Internet Security, Inc., Overview of the Cyber Problem—A Nation Dependent and Dealing
with Risk: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and
Development Comm. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security 8 (2003), available at http:/
/www.ranum.com/security/computer_security/editorials/lawyers/Testimony_Schneier
0603.pdf. (“There’s a ‘rising tide’ effect that will happen; once companies deliver products
to the increasingly demanding specifications of the government, the same products will be
made available to private organizations as well.”).
344. See NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIS., CYBERSECURITY TODAY AND TOMORROW: PAY NOW OR PAY
LATER 14 (2002).
345. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000).
346. Complaint ¶¶ 7–9, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148 (F.T.C. Sept. 20,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305comp0423160.pdf.
347. See id. ¶ 9 (“Respondent’s failure to employ reasonable and appropriate security
measures to protect personal information and files caused or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers . . . .”).
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security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information col-
lected from or about consumers.”348  The FTC has taken action
against several other companies for breaches of their systems as
well.349  So far, the jurisdiction of the agency to bring such actions has
not been challenged.
If users of insecure software are engaged in deceptive trade prac-
tices, and, therefore, subject to FTC enforcement activities, it would
not be difficult for the FTC to argue that a vendor who distributes
insecure software is similarly engaged in “unfair acts or practices”
under the FTC Act.  In 2002, the FTC threatened Microsoft that if it
did not improve the security of its Passport information service, it
could face fines of up to $11,000 per violation, possibly totaling $2.2
trillion.350  Microsoft took the threat seriously enough to invest a re-
ported $100 million351 in a security initiative named “Trustworthy
Computing,” which was claimed to lead to changes in the software
development and testing procedures throughout the company.352
The FTC could begin taking action against vendors of insecure
software under Section 5 of the FTC Act.  The threat of massive fines
348. Decision & Order, In re BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., No. C-4148 (F.T.C. Sept. 20,
2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0423160/092305do0423160.pdf.
349. See, e.g., In re DSW, Inc., No. C-4157 (F.T.C. March 7, 2006), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0523096/0523096c4157DSCDecisionandOrder.pdf (requiring
DSW to implement and maintain an information security protocol that is reasonably de-
signed to protect the security, confidentiality, and integrity of personal information regard-
ing DSW’s customers).
350. See Ashlee Vance, $2 Trillion Fine for Microsoft Security Snafu?, THE REGISTER, May 8,
2003, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/05/08/2_trillion_fine_for_micro
soft/.  The FTC did not accuse Microsoft directly of providing insecure software or ser-
vices, but instead claimed that Microsoft’s stated privacy policies were not accurate regard-
ing security of consumer information.  Complaint, In re Microsoft Corp., No. 012 3240
(F.T.C. Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0123240/microsoftcmp.
pdf.  The FTC and Microsoft settled the matter with a consent decree under which
Microsoft agreed to implement certain security measures and agreed to allow the FTC to
monitor its compliance for twenty years.  Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re
Microsoft Corp., No. 012-3240 (F.T.C. Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
caselist/0123240/microsoftagree.pdf.
351. John Lettice, Bill Gates Spams the World on Trustworthy Computing, THE REGISTER, July
19, 2002, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/07/19/bill_gates_spams_the_
world/.
352. See Robert Lemos, One Year On, Is Microsoft “Trustworthy”?, CNETNEWS.COM, Jan. 23,
2003, http://www.news.com/2102-1001_3-981015.html?tag=st.util.print (discussing
Microsoft’s implementation of the Trustworthy Computing initiative); see also Statement of
Scott Charney, Chief Trustworthy Computing Strategist for Microsoft, Cybersecurity and
Consumer Data: What’s at Risk for the Consumer?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 30–37 (2003) (discussing issues of cybersecurity and Microsoft’s trustworthy
computing initiative).
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might provide the incentive needed to force vendors to invest the nec-
essary money to make their software secure.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whatever steps are taken by the courts, the legislatures, or gov-
ernment agencies, it is clear that the software security issue is getting
progressively worse.353  It is also clear that most vendors will not take
the initiative in this area unless forced to do so by an external force—
such as a threat of FTC fines or the specter of large damage awards.354
“There is no market incentive to produce secure software because
software manufacturers risk nothing when their products are inse-
cure.”355  That needs to change.
353. See, e.g., Jaikumar Vijayan & Todd R. Weiss, List of Data Breaches Grows, COM-
PUTERWORLD, June 26, 2006, http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?com-
mand=printArticleBasic&articleId=112230 (discussing a number of recent data
compromises and security breaches at large companies).
354. See Shawna McAlearney, Suing for Security, INFORMATION SECURITY, Nov. 2003, at 16.
(quoting attorney Stewart Baker, who has said that “[i]f security problems get worse and
worse, juries and judges will be less willing to listen to arguments from software companies
and more and more inclined to make them pay for the problems everyone is encountering
[based on] the standing of the company in the public eye.”).
355. Schneier, Foreword, supra note 3. R
